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Summary 
 
This study investigates the potential effects of Very Light Jet (VLJ) air taxi operations 
adding to delays experienced by commercial passenger air transportation in the year 
2025.  
 
The year 2025 is the FAA and NASA Joint Program Development Office (JPDO) goal 
year for implementation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS). 
 
VLJs are a class of aircraft that are smaller, have somewhat lower performance and are 
lower in cost than the typical business jets of today. 
 
Examples of VLJ designs are the Eclipse 500, Cessna Citation Mustang, Embraer 
Phenom, Adam Aircraft A700, Diamond D-Jet, and Honda-Jet. The Eclipse 500 and 
Cessna Citation Mustang have achieved production certification. Eclipse claims pre-
production VLJ orders for 2600 aircraft, Adam Aircraft for 350 aircraft and Cessna for 
250 aircraft as of November 2006. 
 
The Small Aircraft Transportation System Program (SATS) led by NASA demonstrated 
new operating capabilities that allow higher volume operations at non-towered /non-radar 
airports and lower landing minimum in poor weather at minimally equipped landing 
facilities. These key capabilities make it possible for VLJs to operate at many more 
airports than those used by commercial and business jets today. 
 
The affordable cost relative to existing business jets and ability to use many of the 
existing small, minimally equipped, but conveniently located airports is projected to 
stimulate a large demand for the aircraft. 
 
The resulting increase in air traffic operations will mainly be at smaller airports, but this 
study indicates that VLJs have the potential to increase further the pressure of demand at 
some medium and large airports, some of which are already operating at or near capacity 
at peak times. Currently, some General Aviation (GA) traffic uses many of the major 
airports as identified in the FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan (OEP). In the future VLJ 
air taxi service operators may choose not to use OEP airports due to cost or because of 
congestion. For this reason two main scenarios are examined; allowing VLJ operations at 
OEP airports (OEP case) which currently have significant GA operations and completely 
excluding VLJ operations from all OEP airports (non-OEP case). The non-OEP case is 
considered to be the more likely scenario. 
 
VLJs will also cause an increase in traffic density, and this study shows increased 
potential for conflicts due to VLJ operations.  
 
The projected air traffic demand for 2025 is generated using passenger trip forecast data 
from the Transportation Systems Analysis Model (TSAM) based on socio-economic and 
demographic modeling. (TSAM is under development by Virginia Tech’s Air 
 ii 
 
 
Transportation Systems Laboratory and NASA Langley.) The projected demand for VLJ 
air taxi operations in 2025 is about 20,000 flights per day. This demand is then used as 
input to the Airspace Concepts Evaluation System (ACES) simulator. (ACES is being 
developed as part of the NASA Virtual Airspace Modeling and Simulation Project led by 
NASA Ames Research Center.) The figure at the end of this section shows a screen shot 
of the simulated VLJ air traffic, near a peak time for the traffic density. 
 
All results presented in this study assume perfect weather, with all airports operating 
under Visual Meteorological Conditions and all airspace sectors operating at maximum 
capacity. 
 
The OEP airport capacities are increased by 40% over and above the FAA’s OEP Version 
5 capacities, non-OEP airport capacities are also increased by 40% and sector capacities 
are increased by 300% from current values for the year 2025 analysis. These values are 
the JPDO Evaluation and Analysis Directorate expectations for the capabilities of the 
NGATS. 
 
The key question that this study seeks to answer is –  
 
Will the future use of NAS resources by VLJ traffic be significant enough to 
impact commercial air traffic and increase passenger delays?  
 
The main conclusion is that VLJ air taxi operations have the potential to increase delays 
to commercial traffic, but the effects are likely to be small for the most likely scenario 
where VLJ Air taxi operators avoid using OEP airports.  
 
Simulation results from ACES show that the projected VLJ Air taxi operations for the 
year 2025 could increase total delay for commercial passenger flights by an estimated 
1.3% if VLJ Air Taxis do not use any OEP airports. Simulation results indicate that the 
increase in total delay for commercial passenger flights could be as much as 9.8% if 
VLJs are not excluded from OEP airports that have significant GA traffic today and no 
changes are made to mitigate the effects of VLJs, however this is considered an 
unlikely scenario.  
 
An intermediate scenario is possible where some OEP airports remain attractive to VLJ 
operators and through airspace re-design where necessary, the effects of VLJs are 
reduced. This was not included in this study. 
 
These results should be interpreted with caution – ACES does not have a trajectory based 
model of flights within the terminal area. A high fidelity, trajectory based model might 
reveal more interactions between VLJs and commercial air traffic. A high fidelity model 
might then be used to investigate airspace re-design in the terminal area to mitigate the 
effect of VLJs where necessary. 
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The main results from this analysis are: 
 
• The estimated annual delay to commercial air passenger operations in 2025 
without VLJ operations is 3,323,700 hours. The annual increase in air carrier 
direct operating costs due to this delay, compared to no delay, is estimated to be 
$4.04 billion.  
 
For comparison the estimated annual delay to commercial air passenger 
operations in 2004 is 1,664,100 hours, from ACES simulation results and the air 
carrier direct operating costs due to this delay is estimated to be $2.08 billion. 
The 2025 total delay is approximately twice the 2004 total delay; however the 
number of commercial flights has increased by a factor of 1.85 so the average 
delay per flight is not much larger in 2025 than it was in 2004. 
 
• VLJ air taxi operations have the potential to add an estimated 42,000 hours of 
delay annually to commercial air passenger operations if VLJs do not use OEP 
airports. If some VLJ traffic uses OEP airports and no changes are made to 
mitigate the effects of VLJs, the increase in delay could be as much as 326,000 
hours; however this is considered an unlikely scenario. 
 
• The additional delay due to VLJ air taxi operations potentially results in an 
estimated annual additional cost to commercial air carriers of $42.6 million 
(1.1%) for the non-OEP case, or as much as $425.6 million (10.5%) for the less 
likely OEP case (year 2005$).  
 
• The total increase in cost is quite large for the less likely OEP case, however the 
2025 projected daily flights in the NAS for commercial air passenger operations is 
64,000 per day so the mean increase in cost per flight is about $18 for the OEP 
case and is less than $2 for the non-OEP case. 
 
• The delay in 2025 is mainly due to insufficient airport capacities, the assumed 
300% increase in sector capacities is adequate to meet the demand. 
 
• Although a 300% increase in sector capacity is adequate for the 2025 demand 
even with VLJs, the increase in traffic density due to VLJ operations results in a 
6.6% increase in en-route potential conflicts for the non-OEP case and a 6.9% 
increase for the OEP case, assuming today’s separation standards. However, VLJs 
generally fly at lower altitudes than most commercial air carrier flights, due to 
shorter trip distances and so most of the increase in potential conflicts is between 
VLJs and with other GA traffic. The increase in commercial air carrier potential 
conflicts is 2.1% for the non-OEP case and 1.9% for the OEP case. NGATS 
improvements in technology are expected to allow reduced separation standards 
which would reduce the number of potential conflicts reported by ACES for this 
study. 
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Introduction 
 
This study investigates the potential effects of Very Light Jet (VLJ) air taxi operations 
adding to delays experienced by scheduled commercial passenger air transport. This 
study specifically focuses on VLJs used as air taxis and does not include possible 
additional operations from VLJs used by private individuals, by companies for sole 
company use, or fractional ownership schemes. 
 
Terminology: This report uses the term “commercial” to refer to Air Carrier, 
Scheduled Commuter and Air Taxi operations i.e. excluding GA and Cargo. VLJ Air 
Taxi operations are referred to separately from GA and existing Air Taxi operations. 
 
VLJs are a class of aircraft that are smaller and have somewhat lower performance than 
the typical business jet of today. The typical VLJ has a maximum take off weight of 
around 6000 lbs to 10,000 lbs, seats 3 to 5 passengers and has a cruise speed of around 
350 kts with a maximum useable range of around 1000 nm. VLJs are capable of reaching 
much the same altitudes as commercial jets. In comparison, typical business jets seat 6 to 
20 passengers and have similar or better performance than today’s commercial jets in 
terms of cruise speeds and cruise altitudes. 
 
Examples of VLJ designs are the Eclipse 500, Cessna Citation Mustang, Embraer 
Phenom, Adam Aircraft A700, Diamond D-Jet, and Honda-Jet. The Eclipse 500 and 
Cessna Citation Mustang have achieved production certification. Eclipse claims pre-
production VLJ orders for 2600 aircraft, Adam Aircraft for 350 aircraft and Cessna for 
250 aircraft as of November 2006. 
 
VLJs will cost in the region of $1.5 to $3 million compared to the cost of a conventional 
business jet, typically $6 to $12 million. The relatively low cost makes VLJs attractive to 
a wider income range of private owners and “on-demand” air taxi operators. 
 
The Small Aircraft Transportation System Program (SATS) http://sats.nasa.gov/ led by 
NASA,  demonstrated new operating capabilities that allow higher volume operations at 
non-towered /non-radar airports and lower landing minimum in poor weather at 
minimally equipped landing facilities. These key capabilities make it possible for VLJs to 
operate at many more airports than those used by commercial, air taxi and business jets 
today. 
 
The affordable cost and ability to use many of the existing small, minimally equipped, 
but conveniently located airports will stimulate a large demand for the aircraft. 
 
The resulting increase in air traffic operations will mainly be at smaller airports, but has 
the potential to increase further the pressure of demand at some medium and large 
airports, some of which are already operating at or near capacity at peak times. VLJs will 
also cause an increase in traffic density, which may cause an increase in potential 
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conflicts and increased airspace congestion in busy National Airspace System (NAS) 
sectors. 
 
The key question that this study seeks to answer is –  
 
Will the future use of NAS resources by VLJ traffic be significant enough to 
impact commercial air traffic and increase passenger delays?  
 
The impact will depend on a number of factors, the most important of which are: 
 
• level of demand; 
• distance of trips, which determines the optimum altitude of the flight; 
• origin and destination airports of trips.  
 
The number of VLJ aircraft in service is projected to reach about 5000 by 2017 according 
to FAA forecasts; however this study will focus on the farther term, in-line with the FAA 
and NASA Joint Program Development Office (JPDO) www.jpdo.aero goal for NGATS 
implementation, so the year 2025 is chosen. A detailed forecast of demand for 2025 is 
generated. 
 
The distance distribution of trips is important, since longer trips lead to higher altitudes 
for efficient operations. VLJ air taxis will fly shorter trips on average than commercial air 
transports and current business jets and may not reach the altitudes where most 
commercial jet traffic flies today. However, the trip distance is dependent on the 
assumptions made when modeling demand for trips, so an alternative business model is 
also examined that generates somewhat longer VLJ flights, reaching slightly higher 
altitudes than the primary model. 
 
The origin and destination airport distribution is also important. VLJs can land on 
runways as short as 3,000 ft and therefore can access as many as 3,400 of the 5,000 or so 
smaller airports available in the U.S. However, much of the demand is between large 
centers of population and often the most convenient airport is either the same major 
airport already heavily used by commercial air transports or an airport in close proximity.  
 
Many of the major airports are used by General Aviation (GA) traffic; the number of 
business jets operations at some airports can be significant. Table 1 identifies the 35 OEP 
airports and lists the number of commercial and GA operations recorded in the 19 
February 2004 Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS) data. (This is the day 
chosen for the JPDO Evaluation and Analysis Directorate (EAD) baseline traffic day.) In 
the future it is likely that VLJ air taxi service operators may choose not to use OEP 
airports, due to cost or because of congestion. For this study two VLJ air taxi scenarios 
are examined, one allowing the use of OEP airports where GA traffic is present today and 
the other with VLJs completely excluded from all OEP airports. 
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ID Name 
Number of 
Commercial 
Operations 
(excluding 
cargo)    
Number of 
GA 
Operations 
Percentage 
of GA 
Operations 
ATL Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International   2551 30 1.2
BOS Boston Logan International                 923 40 4.2
BWI Baltimore-Washington International         705 52 6.9
CLE Cleveland Hopkins                          737 31 4.0
CLT Charlotte/Douglas International            1090 79 6.8
CVG 
Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky 
International 1283 13 1.0
DCA Ronald Reagan Washington National         766 3 0.4
DEN Denver International                       1431 10 0.7
DFW Dallas/Fort Worth International            2167 21 1.0
DTW Detroit Metro Wayne County                 1301 44 3.3
EWR Newark Liberty International               1085 18 1.6
FLL Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International   560 90 13.8
HNL Honolulu International                     Excluded from study  
IAD Washington Dulles International            802 181 18.4
IAH Houston George Bush Intercontinental      1342 45 3.2
JFK New York John F. Kennedy International    701 6 0.8
LAS Las Vegas McCarran International           1132 127 10.1
LAX Los Angeles International                  1369 25 1.8
LGA New York LaGuardia                         1101 17 1.5
MCO Orlando International                      783 64 7.6
MDW Chicago Midway                             766 104 12.0
MEM Memphis International                      628 118 15.8
MIA Miami International                        854 52 5.7
MSP Minneapolis-St Paul International          1400 38 2.6
ORD Chicago O'Hare International               2660 31 1.2
PDX Portland International                     589 50 7.8
PHL Philadelphia International                 1055 42 3.8
PHX Phoenix Sky Harbor International           1330 79 5.6
PIT Greater Pittsburgh International           887 43 4.6
SAN San Diego International - Lindbergh Field 474 34 6.7
SEA Seattle-Tacoma International               800 4 0.5
SFO San Francisco International                748 47 5.9
SLC Salt Lake City International               897 81 8.3
STL Lambert-St. Louis International            709 29 3.9
TPA Tampa International                        582 92 13.6
Table 1 OEP Airports List with Number of Commercial and General Aviation Operations 
on 19 February 2004  
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Simulation Programs 
 
The simulation program used for this study is the Airspace Concepts Evaluation 
System (ACES) Simulator (build 4.2) which was developed as part of the NASA Virtual 
Airspace Modeling and Simulation Project led by Ames Research Center. 
http://vams.arc.nasa.gov 
 
ACES is a comprehensive air transportation systems simulator and includes aircraft 
models, airport models, airspace boundaries, traffic flow management, airline operations 
center, conflict detection and resolution and a trajectory propagator. 
 
 5 
 
 
Demand Data Sets 
 
An analysis of future concepts for air transportation systems depends on being able to 
predict future demand and transportation patterns. Two approaches to demand generation 
are discussed, using the FAA Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) and using the Virginia Tech/ 
NASA Langley Transportation Systems Analysis Model (TSAM). Different categories of 
air traffic do not have the same patterns of growth and are treated separately.  
 
The baseline schedule for current traffic levels used was ETMS recorded data for 19 Feb 
2004 (includes international flights). This is the day chosen for the JPDO Evaluation and 
Analysis Division (EAD) baseline traffic day. 
 
The year chosen for the demand projection used in this study is 2025 which is the 
NGATS goal year for implementation. 
 
The demand data sets generated are in ACES format and include the following data 
items: 
 
• Aircraft ID 
• Aircraft Type 
• Departure Airport 
• Arrival Airport 
• Cruise Altitude (based on ETMS recorded altitude) 
• Cruise Speed (based on ETMS recorded track positions) 
• Waypoint List( based on ETMS recorded routes) 
• Scheduled Gate Departure Time 
 
Note that ACES input data does not include a scheduled gate arrival time. Instead, the 
simulator computes the scheduled gate arrival time based on an unimpeded flight through 
the NAS. The typical performance characteristics for the aircraft type specified in the 
input data, along with the specified cruise altitude and speed are used. Real airline 
schedules typically contain time padding to allow for delays. ACES simulation results 
give a realistic estimate of likely delay, but this should not be directly compared to 
reported delays, which are understated due to schedule padding. 
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Terminal Area Forecast Based Demand Generation 
 
The FAA produces the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) that is the official forecast of 
aviation activity at FAA facilities. www.faa.gov/data_statistics/aviation/taf_reports/ 
The TAF includes forecasts for active airports in the National Plan of Integrated Airport 
Systems (NPIAS). The TAF bases projections mainly on analysis of historical trends 
using data provided by the facilities using FAA guidelines. The FAA Aerospace Forecast 
for fiscal years 2006 – 2017 www.faa.gov/data_statistics/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/ 
predicts that 5000 VLJs will be in operation by 2017, but TAF projections currently do 
not include VLJ operations.  
  
The demand generation sets used in many studies of air transportation systems are 
generated by scaling up baseline current day flight operations, using the differential 
growth factors for different airports extrapolated from the TAF to provide the overall 
demand level required. 
 
Seagull Technology Center / Sensis Corporation has used this approach to generate 
demand data sets for the JPDO. www.sensis.com 
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Demographics Based Demand Generation using the 
Transportation Systems Analysis Model 
 
An alternative methodology for generating future demand sets is available using the 
Transportation Systems Analysis Model (TSAM). TSAM is under development by 
Virginia Tech’s Air Transportation Systems Lab and NASA Langley, for details see 
reference 1.  
 
TSAM improves on traditional transportation analysis models by first modeling all long 
distance travel (one way distance greater that 100 miles) and then projecting the mode 
choice of travelers based on trip characteristics and traveler demographics. Since the 
demand modeling is based on passenger trips and not on flight numbers, alternate future 
scenarios can be investigated based on transporting the same number of passengers using 
a different aircraft fleet mix, new demand driven routes or even entirely new means of 
transportation.  
 
This approach taken for this study is to use TSAM to generate the demand and schedule 
for VLJs, since the TAF does not include VLJ projections, and the 19 Feb 2004 baseline 
does not, of course include any VLJ flights so this precludes scaling from the baseline.  
 
TSAM is also used to generate the demand for future commercial and scheduled 
commuter/ air taxi traffic, but in this case, the schedule is generated by scaling and 
modifying the 19 Feb 2004 baseline as described in the corresponding section below. 
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Demand Generation for Different Categories of Air Traffic 
Commercial Air Carrier, Scheduled Commuter and Air Taxi 
 
TSAM passenger trip data is used to generate the growth factors for 443 commercial 
airports. The TSAM generated growth factors are for passenger trips to and from origin/ 
destination pairs, not aircraft operations. 
 
The FAA Aerospace Forecast for fiscal years 2006-2017 projects an increase in load 
factor following current trends. The load factor for the 19 Feb 2004 baseline demand set 
is about 75.5%. However there is no load factor data for 2025 and extrapolating from 
2017 to 2025 would lead to unreasonably large load factors. For this reason the load 
factor for 2025 is conservatively assumed to be 80%. Current (2006) reported load factors 
are around this value already or slightly higher, but it is not reasonable to expect load 
factors to continue to increase much beyond this. At 80% average load factors, flights at 
peak times will tend to be overbooked and airlines will start to add capacity to avoid 
losing customers. 
 
The TSAM growth factors are modified to account for the increase in load factor then 
used as input to the Future Air Traffic Growth and Schedule Model developed by NASA 
Langley, see reference 2. This code grows the baseline demand set using the Fratar 
Algorithm to generate a schedule.  
 
The schedule is then refined by introducing new direct routes between city pairs, when 
demand warrants (removing connecting flights), based on TSAM passenger trip demand 
between origin and destination airport pairs.  
 
New direct routes are introduced between airport pairs (where none exist in the 2004 
baseline) when passenger demand exceeds 25,000 trips (one-way) annually. This is 
sufficient to justify 2 flights per day each way in a ~50 seat sized aircraft.  
 
The schedule is further refined by substituting larger aircraft for two or more smaller 
aircraft once schedule frequency between an airport pair is sufficient to meet passenger 
needs. 
 
Larger aircraft (along with extra flights) start to be substituted when flight frequency 
reaches 12 flights per day between a city pair, reducing the number of extra flights 
needed to meet the passenger demand. The flight frequency is capped at 40 flights per 
day, or the 2004 frequency if 40 flights per day are exceeded in the 19 Feb 2004 data, see 
Table 2 below. When this limit is reached only larger aircraft are substituted to meet 
passenger demand (no additional flights). This is based on research by Airbus; see the 
Global Market Forecast reference 3. 
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Departure 
Airport 
Arrival 
Airport 
Total 
Departures 
19 Feb 2004 
Total 
Departures 
2025 
Total 
Departures 
2025  
New Routes 
and Larger 
Aircraft 
BOS LGA 44 67 44 
LGA DCA 41 53 41 
SAN LAX 40 67 40 
PDX SEA 38 39 39 
ORD MSP 37 50 39 
ATL DFW 34 73 37 
LAX LAS 34 56 37 
LGA ORD 34 44 35 
Table 2 Commercial and Scheduled Commuter/ Air Taxi Daily Flight Frequency for Top City Pairs 
 
The reduced schedule still maintains a high frequency of passenger service, for example 
the year 2025 frequency of service between ATL and DFW would have been 73 
departures per day, but is reduced to 37 by using direct routes and substituting larger 
aircraft. For ORD to MSP the frequency would have been 50 departures per day but is 
reduced to 39 departures.  
 
The maximum frequency of commercial passenger service between a city pair recorded 
in the 19 Feb 2004 ETMS data only exceeds 40 in a few cases, see Table 2. A frequency 
of 40 corresponds to a departure every 36 minutes if distributed evenly throughout the 
day; in reality more flights would be offered at peak times, so 40 departures per day can 
easily provide a departure every 15 minutes during the peak periods.  
 
The growth in passenger demand from TSAM is projected to be about 2X (100%) system 
wide by the year 2025. (Individual airports may have lower or higher growth than this 
average.) This would require a corresponding 2X system wide increase in operations to 
meet this demand based on the same load factors, routes and aircraft fleet mix as the 19 
Feb 2004 baseline demand set. 
 
The combined effects of increased passenger load factors, new direct routes and use of 
larger aircraft reduces the growth in commercial operations required to meet the same 
passenger demand to about 1.68X (68%) system wide. This reduction is very significant; 
furthermore, the largest reductions in operations naturally occur at the busiest airports. 
 
Table 3 below compares the numbers of commercial operations for 19 Feb 2004 
compared with 2025 based on direct scaling of current traffic to meet the required growth 
in demand and with 2025 introducing new routes and substituting larger aircraft. The 
growth in operations required to meet the same passenger demand is reduced from 118% 
to 62% at ATL and from 88% to 54% at ORD. 
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19 Feb 2004 2025  2025 New Routes/ Large 
Aircraft 
 
Dep Arr Tot Dep Arr Tot Growth 
Ratio 
Dep Arr Tot Growth 
Ratio 
ATL 1321 1278 2599 2836 2824 5660 2.18 2116 2085 4201 1.62 
ORD 1387 1382 2769 2598 2596 5194 1.88 2144 2109 4253 1.54 
Table 3 Number of Daily Operations at ORD and ATL 
 
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the reduced future departure demand for commercial 
passenger aircraft at ATL and ORD compared to not using larger aircraft and new routes 
(arrival demand is similarly reduced). For comparison, the 19 Feb 2004 scheduled 
demand is shown also. Note that the airport capacity shown is the NGATS increased 
future capacity (1.4X OEP Version 5) as described in the Airport and Airspace Capacity 
section of this report.  
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Figure 1 ATL Commercial Flight Scheduled Departures 
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Figure 2 ORD Commercial Flight Scheduled Departures 
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Cargo 
 
The cargo air traffic was simply scaled by a fixed factor, not by individual airport, to 
approximately represent the cargo demand expected in 2025. The cargo traffic is not a 
significant factor in this study. The number of cargo flights in the 19 Feb 2004 demand 
set is only 4.7% of the total and many cargo flights take place at night, when NAS 
capacity is not an issue. 
General Aviation IFR Flights 
 
The GA IFR traffic is not modeled in TSAM and was generated using the GA Operations 
Model, see reference 4. VFR traffic was not included. 
 
Note: VFR flights can be generated by the GA Operations Model but were not included 
because the focus of this study is the impact of VLJ air taxi operations on commercial 
traffic, these are all IFR flights. Also, a current limitation of ACES is that no distinction 
between IFR and VFR flights can be made, so any VFR flights added to the simulation 
would add to the IFR traffic load, giving incorrect results. 
Very Light Jet Air Taxi Operations 
  
The VLJ air taxi schedule was generated directly from TSAM. Two variations of the data 
sets were generated, one which allows VLJs to use those OEP airports which today allow 
GA traffic and the second where VLJs do not use any OEP airports. (This may occur 
through regulation or by choice of the operator as discussed in the introduction to this 
report.)  All VLJ schedules used the TSAM parameters listed in the Table 4 below.  
 
The majority of the analysis runs used a fixed cost rate of $1.85 per passenger mile in 
year 2000 $ (this is $2.10 in 2005 $).  This rate is based on a cost analysis performed as 
part of the SATS program, updated to reflect increases in fuel costs. 
 
As an alternative, a variable cost business model was used to generate a different VLJ 
demand set using the cost schedule in Table 5. The shorter distances trips cost more per 
mile due to fixed operating costs and lower average fuel efficiency for short distance 
trips. The variable cost model results in a moderately increased average trip distance for 
VLJs. 
 
 13 
 
 
 
Model Version Version 3.8 - Release - Date : 04/25/2006 
AveragePartySizeBusiness 2.13 persons 
AveragePartySizeNonBusiness 3.40 persons 
SATSPlane VLJ.PTF generic vehicle 
SATSPlaneMaximumAltitude 400 FL 
SATSPlaneRange 1100 NM 
SATSPlaneAcceptanceRate .76 acceptance rates of potential clients 
SATSPlaneMaxOccupancy 4 passengers 
SATSPlaneLoadFactor .7 fraction of maximum occupancy 
AnnualUtilization (hours) 1200 hours 
AnnualOperatingDays 300 days 
RepositioningFlights 25 percent 
StopOverTimeMinutes 45 minutes 
Table 4 TSAM Parameters used for VLJs 
 
Distance Statute Miles Cost per Mile 2000 $ 
75 3.4 
100 2.5 
150 2.25 
200 2.04 
300 1.83 
400 1.69 
500 1.63 
600 1.60 
700 1.58 
800 1.56 
900 1.55 
1000 1.55 
Table 5 VLJ variable Cost Model 
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NGATS Improvements in Airport Processing Time and Gate to 
Gate Time 
 
The current airport passenger processing time has been significantly impacted by 
enhanced security procedures. A goal of the JPDO NGATS is to reduce curb-to-curb 
travel time by 30%. Much of this reduction will be achieved by decreasing airport 
processing times, with some improvement also gained by reduced taxi times and shorter 
block times due to more direct routing. 
 
The NGATS improvements are not expected to reduce VLJ air taxi curb-to-curb times 
further since these are already assumed to be shorter than for commercial airline 
transportation. 
 
The reduction in commercial airline trip times has an impact on passenger transportation 
mode choice. Passengers will be more likely to choose commercial flights if the 
processing time is reduced and less likely to use cars or VLJs. These effects are captured 
by TSAM using the values in Table 6. For this reason a second demand set was generated 
using the assumed reduced processing times. In addition a small reduction in gate-to-gate 
time for commercial flights of 5% was assumed to be provided by NGATS 
improvements. 
 
 Current Processing Time (hrs) NGATS Reduced Processing Time 
(hrs) 
 Departure Arrival Departure Arrival 
Large Hub 2.0 0.75 1.0 0.5 
Medium Hub 1.5 0.75 1.0 0.5 
Small Hub 1.25 0.5 0.75 0.33 
Non Hub 1.0 0.5 0.75 0.33 
Table 6 NGATS Reduced Airport Processing Times 
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Definition of Demand Sets for Analysis 
 
Table 7 below lists the various categories of flights and flight numbers used to construct 
the demands sets. Table 8 identifies the actual demand sets used for individual ACES 
runs. Each set has a unique Case ID; this is later used when discussing results for ease of 
reference. 
 
Note that all future demand sets include the assumed increased passenger load factors 
compared to 19 Feb 2004. 
 
 
 19 Feb 20041  
 
2025 Base 
(without airport 
processing 
improvements) 
2025 NGATS 
(reduced 
commercial 
airport processing 
times - 5% gate to 
gate) 
Commercial/ 
Scheduled Commuter 
Air Taxi 
34,471 57,964
(64,395 without New 
Routes/ Larger Ac)
64,059
Cargo 2,323 4,607 4,607
GA 12,367 30,397 30,397
VLJ  $1.85 N/A 24,872 20,904
VLJ $1.85 (excluded 
from OEP airports) 
N/A 23,892 19,918
VLJ Variable Cost 
Model 
N/A 23,348 20,990
Table 7 Number of Flights in Demand Sets by Category 
 
1. The 19 Feb 2004 ETMS includes about 8000 flights which do not enter or cross 
the contiguous U.S. These are either international or internal Alaska or Pacific 
Islands and were removed. Also military flights have been removed. The figures 
in the table above are after removal of these flights. 
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Case 
ID 
Data Set Total 
Flights 
Multiple of  
19 Feb 2004 
 Baseline Day  
1 19 Feb 2004 Baseline Day 49,961 N/A
 Without NGATS Reduced Times  
2 2025  99,399 1.99
3 2025 with new routes and larger aircraft 92,968 1.86
4 2025 with new routes and larger aircraft + VLJ 
(excluded from OEP airports) 
116,860 2.34
5 2025 with new routes and large aircraft + VLJ at 
OEP 
117,840 2.36
6 2025 with new routes and large aircraft + VLJ at 
OEP (variable cost model 1) 
116,316 2.33
 With NGATS Reduced Times  
7 2025 with new routes and large aircraft 99,063 1.98
8 2025 with new routes and large aircraft + VLJ 
(excluded from OEP airports) 
118,981 2.38
9 2025 with new routes and large aircraft + VLJ at 
OEP 
119,967 2.40
10 2025 with new routes and large aircraft + VLJ AT 
OEP (variable cost model 1) 
120,053 2.40
Table 8 Demand Sets used for Analysis 
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ACES Rejected Flights 
 
ACES rejects flights for various reasons at start of simulation time and the fraction 
rejected can be quite large. The reasons for rejection are listed in Table 9 below for the 19 
Feb. 2004 baseline demand set. The largest single category that is rejected is flights less 
than 80 nm due to Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) overlap. This is a 
design feature of ACES. 
 
Table 10 below shows the number of flights flown in the simulation for each demand set 
after ACES flight rejections. 
 
 
ACES Error Message Number of flights Reason 
Bad departure ARTCC 
index 
100 Unknown 
Bad trajectory 136 ETMS error 
All waypoints are inside all 
meter fixes 
851 Local flights 
Departure and arrival 
airports are the same 
292 Local flights 
Not supported aircraft type 236 Few obscure types 
International flight 1137 This is an ACES bug – 
these are flights that depart 
or arrive at U.S. airport, but 
only travel a short distance 
within the U.S. 
TRACONS overlap 2398 ACES can not handle 
flights which do fly outside 
a TRACON – effectively 
flight distance must be > 80 
nm 
Trajectory contains 
anomalies. 
25 ETMS error 
Unknown aircraft type 37 Few obscure types 
Unknown airport 629 Number of small airports 
missing from ACES data set
Other 24 Unknown 
Total 5865  
Table 9 Flights Rejected by ACES 
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Case 
ID 
Data Set Total 
Flights 
 Baseline Day 
1 19 Feb 2004 43,296
 Without NGATS Reduced Times 
2 2025 Base 89,433
3 2025 Base with new routes and larger aircraft 83,594
4 2025 Base with new routes and larger aircraft + VLJ (excluded 
from OEP airports) 
106,752
5 2025 Base with new routes and large aircraft + VLJ  107,739
6 2025 with new routes and large aircraft + VLJ (variable cost 
model 1) 
106,531
 With NGATS Reduced Times 
7 2025 NGATS with new routes and large aircraft 89,373
8 2025 NGATS with new routes and large aircraft + VLJ 
(excluded from OEP airports) 
108,678
9 2025 NGATS with new routes and large aircraft + VLJ  109,642
10 2025 with new routes and large aircraft + VLJ (variable cost 
model 1) 
109,893
Table 10 Number of Flights in ACES Analysis Runs After Flight Rejections 
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Distance Distribution of Air Traffic 
 
The distance distribution of passenger trips is important because for shorter trips it is not 
efficient to climb to high altitudes, due to the time taken to climb and descend.  The trip 
length of VLJ air taxi operations will determine the maximum altitude and this effects 
how much interaction the VLJs have with commercial aircraft during the en-route stage 
of the flight. All distances in this section are the great circle distance, which is the 
shortest distance between the origin and destination airports and not actual distance 
flown. 
Commercial, Scheduled Commuter and Air Taxi 
 
The distance distribution of commercial and scheduled commuter/ air taxi flights taken 
directly from the ACES demand set generated from ETMS recorded data for 19 Feb 2004 
is shown in Figure 3 below. The average distance of all aircraft is 608 nm and the average 
cruise altitude is 26,400 ft. The average distance of jet only traffic is longer at 736 nm 
and the average cruise altitude is higher at 30,500 ft, see Figure 4. The 2025 base demand 
set has a nearly identical distribution (not shown in figure).  
 
The 2025 demand set with new routes and larger aircraft has a somewhat longer flight 
average distance of 646 nm due to the introduction of longer direct routes replacing 
shorter connecting legs. This change in distance is not sufficient to significantly effect the 
altitude distribution, the average cruise altitude is 26,200 ft (not shown in figure). 
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Figure 3 Distances Flown by All Commercial Flights in 19 Feb 2004 Demand Set 
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Figure 4 Distances Flown by Jet Commercial Flights in 19 Feb 2004 Demand Set
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General Aviation IFR Flights 
 
The distance distribution of general aviation flights taken directly from the ACES 
demand set generated from ETMS recorded data for 19 Feb 2004 is shown in Figure 5 
below. The average distance is 331 nm and the average cruise altitude is 18,100 ft. The 
average distance of jet only GA traffic is longer at 500 nm and the average cruise altitude 
is higher at 29,400 ft, see Figure 6. 
 
The 2025 GA demand data has an average distance for all flights of 443 nm and an 
increased average cruise altitude of 24, 000 ft (not shown in figure). The average distance 
of 2025 jet only GA traffic is 531 nm and the average cruise altitude is 32,400 ft, see 
Figure 7. 
 
The 2025 GA average distance including all flights is significantly longer than the 19 Feb 
2004 average distance. This is explained by the differential growth rates of GA jet traffic 
compared to non-jet traffic. In the 19 Feb 2004 data there are 4942 jet flights out of a 
total of 12,367 flights; jets are 40% of the total. For the 2025 demand GA jet traffic is 
forecast to grow much faster than the non-jet traffic. In the 2025 demand there are 17,669 
jet flights out of a total of 30,397 flights; jets are now 58% of the total. Since jets fly 
longer distances and higher altitudes than non-jets on average, this explains the increases 
noted.  
 
 22 
 
 
Distance Flown by GA Flights - 19 Feb 2004
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 50 10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
40
0
45
0
50
0
55
0
60
0
65
0
70
0
75
0
80
0
85
0
90
0
95
0
10
00
10
50
11
00
11
50
12
00
12
50
13
00
13
50
14
00
14
50
15
00
15
50
16
00
16
50
17
00
17
50
18
00
18
50
19
00
19
50
20
00
Distance NM
N
um
be
r o
f F
lig
ht
s
Number of Flights = 12367 Average Cruise Speed = 278 KTS Average Cruise Altitude = 181 FL Average Distance = 331 NM
 
Figure 5 Distances Flown by GA Flights in 19 Feb 2004 Demand Set 
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Figure 6 Distances Flown by Jet GA Flights in 19 Feb 2004 Demand Set 
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Distance Flown by GA Jet Flights - 2025
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Figure 7 Distances Flown by Jet GA Flights in 2025 Demand Set 
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Very Light Jets Air Taxi Operations 
 
The distance distribution for VLJ flights in the 2025 demand set is shown in Figure 8 
below. The average distance is quite short at 222 nm with an average altitude of 24,200 
ft. This chart is for the demand set with VLJs not excluded from OEP airports and not 
using the NGATS decreased processing and gate-to-gate times. Excluding VLJs from 
OEP airports does not change the distance distribution; using NGATS improvements 
decreases the average distance slightly to 213 nm. The relatively short average distance 
of VLJ flights indicates that the primary market for VLJ air taxi operators is the 
passenger trips currently being taken mainly by automobile. 
 
The VLJ distance distribution is very different to the flight pattern of the GA business 
jets in the 19 Feb 2004 data; compare Figure 8 to Figure 6. The GA business jets fly 
much further and higher on average. Some GA business jets fly distances of 2000 nm or 
more whereas VLJ traffic does not extend beyond 1000 nm due to the range limits of VLJ 
aircraft before a re-fuelling stop is required. When a refueling stop is included the time 
advantage of VLJs is lost compared to commercial air transportation, so there is very 
little demand for air-taxi flights which require a fuel stop. This may not be true of 
personal flights. 
 
The shorter distances flown by VLJs mean that many flights will be below the altitudes 
used by commercial airlines, in less congested airspace.  
 
This usage pattern by VLJs for relatively short trips is driven by two factors: 
 
• For trips of less than about 120 miles driving distance, it does not save much time 
and it costs significantly more to use a VLJ compared to using a car; 
 
• For trips longer than about 600 nm to 700 nm VLJs start to get expensive 
compared to commercial airline fares and the proportional time savings are not as 
great as for medium distance trips. VLJs are slower than commercial jets so the 
time advantage is less for longer range trips and for trips over 1000 nm a fuelling 
stop is required which reduces or eliminates any time advantage over commercial 
flights. 
 
Note that the flight distances are in Nautical Miles and are Great Circle (direct) distances. 
Driving distances will be significantly longer than the Great Circle distance, so for 
example a 150 nm flight distance would generally take at least 200 statute miles to drive. 
 
This pattern is influenced by the business cost model used. For the majority of this 
analysis the cost model used is a straight cost per passenger mile of $1.85, see section on 
demand sets. This was the cost model developed by the SATS program for air-taxi 
operations, updated to reflect increased fuel costs.  
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Airline fares are typically not structured this way. Short distance fares tend to cost 
relatively more per mile than longer distance flights. This is because there are certain 
fixed costs (airport fees, initial crew costs waiting for passengers, etc) which must be met 
for any trip and then there are variable costs which depend on the Distances Flown (fuel, 
maintenance on engines etc).  
 
For this reason an alternative fare structure was developed which better reflects operating 
costs of the VLJ service, based on trip distance. This was described in the section on 
demand generation, see Table 5. The cost per mile is more than $1.85 for trips less than 
about 300 nm and then becomes less than $1.85, leveling off at about $1.60 to $1.55 for 
the longer trips. 
 
The variable fare cost model increases the average flight distance to 251 nm and the 
average cruise altitude to 25,900 ft, see Figure 9. The increase is not large, but the 
alternative business model was used for an ACES simulation run to compare with the 
fixed cost model. 
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Distance Flown by VLJ Flights - 2025
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Figure 8 Distances Flown by VLJ Flights in 2025 Demand Set with Fixed Cost Business Model 
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Figure 9 Distances Flown by VLJ Flights in 2025 Demand Set with Variable Cost Business Model 
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Airport and Airspace Capacity Increases due to NGATS  
 
Airport and airspace capacities were increased in-line with the JPDO Evaluation and 
Analysis Division assumptions used in assessment of NGATS, these being NGATS goals 
for capacity improvements. 
 
The sector capacities (MAP values in ACES) were increased to a factor of 3 times 
today’s values. 
 
The airport capacity values (VFR and IFR nodal airport model arrival and departure rates 
in ACES) were increased to a factor of 1.4 times over and above the FAA’s OEP version 
5 planned improvements. This was done for all airports, not just OEP airports. 
 
These increased capacities were used for all assessment simulation runs except for the 19 
Feb 2004 baseline assessment where today’s values of airspace and airport capacity were 
used. 
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Analysis of Results from ACES 
 
This section contains a summary of the results from ACES simulation runs followed by a 
detailed analysis of selected runs. The detailed analysis is separated for airports, airspace 
sectors and potential conflicts. The detailed analysis is only applied to the demand sets 
with NGATS reduced gate to gate times since this is the scenario which incorporates the 
JPDO goal. Each test case is given a Case ID number which relates back to the 
corresponding demand set, see Table 8. 
 
All simulation runs are for a perfect VFR day and therefore use VFR Airport 
capacities and maximum sector capacities throughout the day. 
 
The ACES simple nodal model was used for all airports, with generic 40 nm circular 
TRACON boundary and 4 equal-spaced departure and arrival fixes except for some 
additional test cases for the Chicago TRACON see section on ACES enhanced TRACON 
modeling in this report. 
 
The bulk of the test cases used the following ACES user input options, see user guide, 
reference 5 for description. 
 
• AOC Operation=Off 
• Perform Delay Maneuvers=true 
• Perform CD&R=false 
• Enable Surface Traffic Limitations=true 
• Perform Arrival Fix Spacing=false 
• Disable Arrival Fix TRACON Delay=true 
• Disable  Departure Fix TRACON Delay=true 
 
Additional test cases were performed with Perform CD&R=true, to evaluate the number 
of potential conflicts. 
 
The additional test cases for the Chicago TRACON using the enhanced model used: 
 
• Perform Arrival Fix Spacing=true 
• Disable Arrival Fix TRACON Delay=false 
• Disable  Departure Fix TRACON Delay=false 
 
 
The results obtained from ACES should be interpreted carefully – ACES does not have a 
trajectory based model of flights within TRACONS. A high fidelity, trajectory based 
model might reveal more interactions between VLJs and commercial air traffic. A high 
fidelity model might then be used to investigate re-design of the TRACON to mitigate the 
effect of VLJs where necessary. The results from this study are subject to the limitations 
of the ACES modeling.  
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Definition of ACES Delays 
 
ACES computed delays are based on an unimpeded flight through the NAS and do not 
include schedule padding. Airlines typically add a certain amount of time to their flight 
schedule, because they value predictability above advertising the minimum possible 
flight time. 
  
ACES simulation results give a realistic estimate of likely delay, but this should not be 
directly compared to reported delays, which are understated due to schedule padding. In 
addition airlines do not count flights as delayed, for reporting purposes, until the delay is 
greater than 15 minutes in accordance to the FAA definition of a delayed flight. (Actual 
flights delays less than 15 minutes are recorded in the FAA databases and can be 
obtained, but still include schedule padding.) 
 
ACES defines the following delays, not of all of which are used in this analysis: 
 
Ground Hold 
depDelay = actualGateDepartureTime – scheduledGateDepartureTime 
 
Taxi Out 
takeOffDelay = actualTakeoffTime – scheduledTakeoffTime – depDelay 
 
Enroute + TRACON Delay 
landingDelay = actualLandingTime – scheduledLandingTime – depDelay - takeOffDelay 
 
Taxi In 
arrDelay = actualGateArrivalTime – scheduledGateArrivalTime – depDelay – takeOffDelay -landingDelay 
 
Total Delay 
totalDelay = depDelay + takeOffDelay + landingDelay + arrDelay 
 
Airborne Delay 
airDelay = landingDelay 
 
Ground Delay 
grndDelay = takeOffDelay + arrDelay 
 
Hold Delay 
holdDelay = depDelay 
 
Notes 
 
Departure Airport gets credited with depDelay + takeOffDelay 
Arrival Airport gets credited with landingDelay + arrDelay 
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Definition of ACES Conflict Counts 
 
Conflict counts reported by ACES should be interpreted as follows. Conflicts are 
recorded per aircraft by ACES, so each conflict situation between a pair of aircraft results 
in 2 conflicts and a 3 way conflict would result in a count of 3 conflicts. Only en-route 
conflicts are reported, since ACES does not have the capability to detect conflicts within 
the TRACON. These conflict counts are for potential conflicts and are based on today’s 
separation standards. The en-route conflict detection algorithm in ACES reports a conflict 
when aircraft are separated by less than 2000 ft in altitude and less than 7 nm in distance 
(default can be changed). The current FAA separation minimum is 5 nm so ACES is 
actually reporting potential conflicts; a 2 nm buffer is used to allow for conflict 
resolution. In addition ACES only allows specification of a single parameter for altitude 
separation so does not take into account reduced Vertical Separation Minimum which 
requires 1000 ft minimum between FL290–410. NGATS also expects future technology 
to enable en-route minimum lateral separations to be reduced; this was not evaluated in 
this study. For these reasons the actual conflict counts reported by ACES are only 
potential conflicts and also overstate the number of potential conflicts that would require 
resolutions in the 2025 demand scenario, since reduced separations were not used. The 
values reported by ACES are useful for comparison purposes between simulation runs, 
but are not to be interpreted as a realistic measure of actual conflicts. 
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Summary 
 
Summary results from all simulation runs are presented in Table 11.  
19 Feb 2004 Baseline Day Delays 
 
The mean delay per commercial flight in the 19 Feb 2004 demand set (Case ID 1) is 514 
seconds which gives a baseline number to compare with the delays resulting from the 
2025 demand sets. The mean delay for all flights in the 19 Feb 2004 demand set is lower 
at 428 seconds, since this includes GA flights many of which fly to small airports and 
experience very little delay. The mean delay per commercial flight is the more useful 
metric for this study. The average peak sector load for the top 50 sectors of 19.1 aircraft 
is closely matched to the average capacity of 18.3, based on today’s MAP values. Clearly 
today’s sectors are designed to be able to cope with the current expected traffic load and 
do so with little (or no) spare capacity for the top loaded sectors at peak times. The total 
number of potential conflicts ACES reports for this demand set was 19,851 or 45.9% as a 
proportion of the total flights.  
2025 Delays without VLJs 
 
The 2025 demand without new routes and without larger aircraft (Case ID 2) results in a 
78% increase in mean delay per commercial flight of 916 seconds. This indicates that 
even with the assumed 1.4X increase in airport capacity and 3X increase in sector 
capacity the NAS will not have sufficient capacity to handle 2025 traffic, if based only on 
adding more frequent flights to meet demand, without a substantial increase in delay. 
 
The constraint is not sector capacity; 3X sector capacities are more than sufficient. 
Average peak sector load for the top 50 sectors is 34.4 aircraft and the average peak 
sector capacity is 53.5 aircraft. The reason for the increased delay is insufficient airport 
capacity. This is as expected since the total number of flights in this demand set increased 
by a factor of 2X and the airspace sector capacities were increased by 3X, whereas the 
airport capacities were only increased by 1.4X.  
 
The number of potential conflicts increases to 71,193 or 79.6% as a proportion of the 
total flights. This is an increase by a factor of 3.6, whereas the number of flights increases 
by a factor of 2.1 compared to the 19 Feb 2004 data. This is as expected since simplified 
theory predicts that the number of potential conflicts increases in proportion to the square 
of the traffic density (assuming uniform traffic density, which is not actually the case).  
 
The 2025 passenger demand will not be met by a straight scaling of existing flights and 
routes. In reality airlines will introduce new direct routes and larger aircraft to better meet 
the demand. The 2025 demand met by inclusion of new routes and larger aircraft (Case 
ID 3) therefore represents a more likely scenario. The simulation results now show a 41% 
decrease in mean delay per commercial flight compared to 19 Feb. 2004; delay is reduced 
to 302 seconds. This indicates that the assumed airport capacity increase of 1.4X is 
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sufficient to meet 2025 passenger demand for most airports when a realistic future 
scenario is used. The 3X sector capacity increase is more than sufficient - in fact a sector 
capacity increase of 2X would be adequate for most sectors for this demand set. 
 
Using reduced airport processing times and slightly shorter block times due to NGATS 
improvements results in more flights with a corresponding increase in mean delay per 
commercial flight to 549 seconds (Case ID 7). This is a 7% increase in delay compared to 
the 19 Feb 2004 baseline day. Potential conflicts also increase to 77,499 due to increased 
traffic density. 
2025 Delays with VLJs 
 
The addition of VLJ flights does have some effect on commercial air traffic. The most 
likely scenarios are those with NGATS improvements applied to the commercial traffic 
only, non-NGATS cases are also included in Table 11 below for completeness but are not 
discussed in detail. 
 
The addition of VLJ flights with no restrictions on use of OEP airports (Case ID 9) adds 
54 seconds mean delay per commercial flight (compared with Case ID 7). This is an 
increase of 9.8% which is significant. (The cost to commercial air carriers is analyzed in 
a later section of this document.)  The peak sector loading for the top 50 sectors increases 
only slightly by about 1 additional aircraft on average. The number of potential conflicts 
increases by 6.9% to 82,848, due to VLJs. 
 
If the VLJ flights are excluded from OEP airports (Case ID 8) then the increase in mean 
delay per commercial flight is much less at 7 seconds, which is 1.3%. This may be the 
most likely scenario since VLJ operators may choose to mainly avoid the largest airports 
in favor of less congested and more conveniently located smaller airports. The total 
number of potential conflicts increases by 6.6% to 82,645 compared to the case without 
VLJs. 
 
The variable cost per mile business model (Case ID 10) for VLJ operations results in 
somewhat longer average flight distances and higher altitudes (compare Figure 8 and 
Figure 9) but the delay to commercial flights is virtually unchanged. The sector loading 
and number of potential conflicts are also very similar to the fixed cost case (Case ID 9). 
These results indicate that the modest changes to flight distance and altitude profiles that 
result from the variable cost business model do not significantly change the impact to 
commercial flights. 
 
Note that the addition of VLJ flights reduces the mean delay per flight when all flights (not just commercial 
flights) are included in the calculation of the average value. This is because the VLJ flights mainly operate 
to and from smaller less congested airports (even for the cases where VLJs are not excluded from OEP 
airports) and have smaller delays than the average commercial flight. The addition of more flights with less 
delay per flight will of course lower the overall average. It is misleading to compare overall average values 
for dissimilar data sets, which is why for this analysis only the average values for commercial flights are 
compared. 
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Case 
ID 
Demand Set Mean 
Delay 
per 
Flight 
(secs) 
Mean 
Delay 
per 
Commer-
cial 
Flight 
(secs) 
Mean of 
Peak 
Sector 
Load 
Top 50 
Sectors 
(Aircraft) 
Mean of  
Sector 
MAP Top 
50 
Sectors 
(Aircraft)  
Total 
Potential 
conflicts 
 Baseline Day      
1 19 Feb 2004 428 514 19.1 18.3 19,851 
 Without NGATS 
reduced times 
  
  
 
2 2025 632 916 34.4 53.5 71,193 
3 2025 N/L 208 302 33.0 52.6 65,860 
4 2025 N/L VLJ 176 310 34.5 52.2 72,750 
5 2025 N/L OVLJ 193 331 34.8 51.9 72,727 
6 2025 N/L OVLJ 
VC 
196 332 
35.4 52.6 
74,028 
 With NGATS 
reduced times 
  
  
 
7 2025 N/L NG 382 549 35.5 52.9 77,499 
8 2025 N/L NG VLJ 329 556* (562) 36.6 52.9 82,645 
9 2025 N/L NG 
OVLJ 
360 603 
36.5 53.2 
82,848 
10 2025 N/L NG 
OVLJ VC 
358 604 36.8 53.0 82,818 
Table 11 Summary of Results from ACES Simulation Runs 
 
* This value is adjusted to remove an anomalous result for ORD for this test case, see airports analysis 
section for explanation. Value in parenthesis is unadjusted value. 
 
Key 
N/L – Used new direct routes and substituted larger aircraft. 
NG – Used NGATS improved airport processing and gate-to-gate times. 
VLJ –    Added VLJs, excluded from OEP airports. 
OVLJ – Added VLJs, allowed into OEP airports. 
VC – Used variable cost model for VLJs. 
 
Notes 
1) Mean Delay per commercial flights excludes GA, Cargo, VLJ from calculation of delay. 
2) Top 50 sectors are the sectors with highest peak 5 minute load values and may differ from run to run. 
3) Monitor Alert Parameter values are today’s values for 2004, and 3X today’s values for 2025. Mean is 
the average value for top 50 loaded sectors. 
4) Potential conflicts are from ACES en-route conflict detection and resolution model and may not 
accurately represent actual conflicts, but can be used for comparison between runs. Each conflict is per 
aircraft so a conflict situation involving 2 aircraft counts as 2 potential conflicts. 
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Airports Analysis 
 
The demand sets used for the simulation runs are identified by Case ID number and the 
details of each are listed in Table 8. 
Analysis of 19 February 2004 Baseline Day 
The 19 Feb 2004 numbers of operations and delays are analyzed for comparison with 
2025 results. 
Number of Operations in 19 February 2004 Baseline Day 
 
Figure 10 shows the number of daily flight operations (departures plus arrivals, excluding 
cargo) at the busiest 50 airports in the 2004 demand set (Case ID 1). Included on the 
same figure for comparison are the commercial and GA operations. The busiest 
commercial airports are ORD, ATL and DFW. These airports all have a very small 
number of GA flights. Several of the other top 50 commercial airports do have significant 
GA traffic, the percentage of GA flights at LAS is 10%, IAD is 18%, DAL is 32% and 
HOU is 25% for example.  
 
 
Number of Commercial and General Aviation Operations at Top 50 Airports for 19 Feb 2004
(sorted by number of commercial operations)
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Figure 10 Number of Commercial and GA Operations at Top 50 Busiest Airports for 19 Feb 2004 
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 19 Feb 2004 Baseline Day Delays 
 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show commercial flights total delay and mean delay per 
operation for the top 50 airports with most total delay (Case ID 1). The delays reported 
include both departure and arrival operations. 
 
ORD (Chicago O’Hare International, IL) has the most total delay at 437 hours which 
corresponds to a mean delay of 592 seconds per operation. MSP (Minneapolis-St Paul 
International Airport, MN) has the next highest total delay at 285 hours, and has a 
higher mean delay per operation of 733 seconds. ATL (Atlanta Hartsfield International, 
GA) has 195 hours total delay and 275 seconds of delay per operation. ALB (Albany 
International Airport, New York) has the highest mean delay per operation at 798 
seconds.  
 
Figure 13 is a representation of the distribution of delays. Only flights with delay are 
included in this chart, flights with zero delay are excluded from the statistics. The 
intersection of the solid bars represents the Median (mid-point of the data, half the delays 
are larger and half smaller). The limits of the solid bars represent the 25th percentile and 
75th percentile of the data and the end point lines represent the 10th percentile and 90th 
percentile of the data.  
 
For example, the Median delay at ORD is 210 seconds, 75% of flights with delay have 
delays of less than 525 seconds and 90% of flights with delay have delays of less than 
1437 seconds.  
 
A few flights at ORD had quite long delays, 7 flights were delayed by more than 3 hours, 
and the maximum delay was 3 hours 59 minutes (not shown on chart). These few flights 
should probably not have been delayed for such long periods; ACES Traffic Flow 
Management tends to hold a few flights for an unreasonably long time on the ground. In 
reality a more equitable distribution of delay would be likely with a few more flights 
being held for shorter periods, allowing flights which had been waiting for a significant 
time to be released. (Weather is not a factor here; this is a good weather day with VFR 
capacities assumed for all sectors and airports.) However, holding a few flights for an 
unreasonable length of time has a minimal effect on the overall total and average delays. 
 
The airports with fewer operations naturally show a broader distribution of delays, since 
the percentiles include more of the flights with large delays. For example BDL has 241 
operations, 99 of which are delayed. 90% of flights with delay have delays of less than 
4827 seconds (1 hour 20 minutes). 11 flights have delays of more than 1 hour and the 
maximum delay was 5 hours 24 minutes. The 90th percentile in this case includes one of 
the flights with more than 1 hour of delay. 
 
The delay distribution chart only includes flights with delays, for some airports a 
significant number of flights do not have any delay. Figure 14 shows the percentage of 
flights with delays. The numbers on the bars show the actual number of operations.  
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For example ORD has a total of 2660 commercial operations, 303 with zero delay, 1962 
with delays of 15 minutes or less and 395 with delays of more than 15 minutes. 
 
A more detailed view of delays at ORD and ATL are presented in Figure 15 and Figure 
16. At ORD, 85% of departure plus arrival operations have delays of less than 15 
minutes. At ATL, 94% of operations have delays of less than 15 minutes. (Commercial 
airlines flights are counted as on-time by the FAA if less than 15 minutes late.)  
 
These delays are with respect to an unimpeded flight and do not include any schedule 
padding, as per the ACES definition of delay. Delays with respect to the airline schedule 
would therefore be lower and would likely show few flights with delay greater than 15 
minutes. This is as expected, the 19 Feb 2004 data is an actual schedule derived from 
ETMS for a day with good weather and the simulation assumed perfect VFR conditions. 
The delays should be low.  
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19 Feb 2004 Commercial Flights Total Delay for Top 50 Airports
(sorted by total delay)
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Figure 11 Commercial Flights Total Hours of Delay at Top 50 Airports for 19 Feb 2004 Demand 
 
19 Feb 2004 Commercial Flights Delay per Operation
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Figure 12 Commercial Flights Mean Delay per Operation at Top 50 Airports for 19 Feb 2004 
Demand 
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19 Feb 2004 Commercial Flights Delay Range for Top 50 Airports
(sorted by total delay)
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Figure 13 Commercial Flights Delay Range at Top 50 Airports for 19 Feb 2004 Demand 
 
19 Feb 2004 Percentage of Commercial Flights Delayed for Top 50 Airports
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Figure 14 Percentage of Commercial Flights Delayed at Top 50 Airports for 19 Feb 2004 Demand 
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19 Feb 2004 Commercial Flight Delays at ORD
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Figure 15 Statistical Distributions of Delays at ORD for 19 Feb 2004 Demand 
 
19 Feb 2004 Commercial Flight Delays at ATL
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Figure 16 Statistical Distributions of Delays at ATL for 19 Feb 2004 Demand 
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Analysis of 2025 Demand 
Number of Operations in 2025 
 
Figure 17 shows the number of daily flight operations (departures plus arrivals, excluding 
cargo) at the busiest 50 airports in the 2025 demand set (Case ID 9) 
 
Included on the same figure for comparison are the commercial, GA and VLJ operations. 
The busiest commercial airports are ORD, ATL and DFW. The top 3 airports all have a 
very small number of GA flights and only ATL attracts a few VLJ flights, at 32 VLJ 
operations total.  
 
Figure 18 shows the VLJ operations sorted in order of busiest VLJ airports, with VLJs at 
OEP airports.  
 
The airport with most VLJ operations is HOU (William P. Hobby Airport, Houston TX) 
at 435 daily operations closely followed by PDK (Dekalb-Peachtree Airport, Atlanta, 
GA) at 384 operations and TEB (Teterboro Airport, NJ) at 336 operations. VGT (North 
Las Vegas Airport, NV) and DAL (Dallas Love Field Airport, TX) both have more than 
300 daily operations. These airports are all situated close to major population centers and 
currently have significant GA operations. 
 
The OEP airports that attract most VLJ operations are LAS (McCarran International 
Airport, Las Vegas, NV) at 265 operations, MDW (Chicago Midway International 
Airport, IL) at 260 operations and IAD (Washington Dulles International Airport, DC) at 
204 daily operations. 
 
 
Figure 19 shows the VLJ operations when VLJs are excluded from OEP airports. Note 
that the number of operations varies somewhat even for the same non-OEP airports for 
the two cases. This is due to dynamic effects of shifting demand, not allowing the use of 
OEP airports may make some non-OEP airports more or less attractive as the origin or 
destination of VLJ flights.   
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Number of Commercial, General Aviation and VLJ Operations at Top 50 Airports 
for 2025 Demand
(NGATS/ New Routes & Larger Aircraft with VLJ at OEP Airports)
(sorted by number of commercial operations)
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Figure 17 Number of Commercial, GA and VLJ Operations at Top 50 Busiest Airports in 2025 
 
Number of VLJ Operations at Top 50 Airports Including VLJs at OEP Airports
for 2025 Demand
(sorted by number of VLJ operations)
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Figure 18 Number of VLJ Operations at Top 50 Busiest Airports for VLJ Air Taxis in 2025 (VLJs at 
OEP Airports) 
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Number of VLJ Operations at Top 50 Airports Excluding VLJs from OEP Airports
for 2025 Demand
(sorted by number of VLJ operations)
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Figure 19 Number of VLJ Operations at Top 50 Busiest Airports for VLJ Air Taxis in 2025 (VLJs 
excluded from OEP Airports) 
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2025 Delays without VLJ Air Taxis 
 
Various 2025 demand sets are used as input for ACES simulations see Table 8. 
 
All 2025 simulation runs used 3X sector capacities and 1.4X airport capacities over and 
above OEP version 5 airport capacity improvements as described previously in this 
report. Non-OEP airports capacities are also increased by 1.4X.   
 
Figure 20 shows the commercial flights total delay for each test case. 
 
The 2025 base demand set without new routes and larger aircraft (Case ID 2) results in 
large delays at many airports, even with the substantial increases in airport capacity. The 
total delay at ATL is 2,110 hours and at ORD is 1,634 hours.  
 
Figure 21 shows the commercial flights delay per operation for each test case. 
 
For the 2025 base demand set without new routes and larger aircraft (Case ID 2) delay 
per operation has increased substantially at many airports compared to the 19 Feb 2004 
day. At ATL the delay per operation is now nearly 1,373 seconds, a factor of five 
increase. At ORD the delay per operation is 1,175 seconds, a factor of two increase.  
 
However, Case ID 2 is not realistic, since it is based on today’s fleet mix and routes. 
Airlines will introduce larger aircraft and new direct routes as demand increases. The 
results from this more likely demand set (Case ID 3) are also shown on the same figure. 
For most airports the delays are much reduced compared to Case ID 2; the delays per 
operation at the larger airports are now at or below the 19 Feb 2004 levels. A few of the 
smaller non-OEP airports, SYR (Syracuse Hancock International Airport, NY), ROC 
(Greater Rochester International Airport, NY), and PWM (Portland Intl Jetport Airport, 
ME) have mean delays per operation that are above 15 minutes; these airports did not 
have significant delays in the 19 Feb 2004 demand. The increase in delays at these 
smaller airports is not due to growth in flights exceeding capacity; it is due to congestion 
at destination airports and is further investigated later in this section. 
 
The NGATS reduced curb-to-curb times (Case ID 7), leads to an increase in passenger 
demand; increased demand has the effect of increasing delays unless corresponding 
improvements in capacity are made. The figures below show the increased delays which 
result. The increases are quite substantial at many airports; in fact this increased delay 
due to congestion would tend to offset some of the improvement in airport processing 
time. This means that the assumed curb-to-curb time improvements may not be fully 
realizable; i.e. the NGATS goal of 30% improvement may not be realized unless airport 
capacity is increased beyond the 1.4X assumed.  
 
This study did not address the feedback effect of increased demand leading to increased 
delays which tends to suppress demand until equilibrium is reached. Future studies could 
use delays from ACES to modify TSAM trip times and generate a modified demand set.  
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The delays are reasonable at most of the larger airports even with NGATS reduced times; 
mean delay per operation at ATL is 278 seconds, about the same as the 19 Feb 2004 
value. The exception is ORD; the mean delay per operation is now 892 seconds, a 50% 
increase compared to 19 Feb 2004.  
 
With NGATS reduced curb-to-curb times, the delays at smaller airports are beginning to 
get quite large, SYR has 2,168 seconds mean delay per operation, ROC has 2,004 
seconds and PWM has 1583 seconds. The reasons for the large delays are investigated 
further since these airports have sufficient capacity for the demand. Table 12 shows the 
delays by flight segment for each of these three airports. In each case the delay is almost 
all departure delay which is due to ACES Traffic Flow Management (TFM) holding 
aircraft at the gate. Once the aircraft are released the delay is minimal since the airports 
have more than adequate capacity; Figure 22 for SYR shows that departure demand is 
well within capacity. The reason for holding flights at the gate is due to congestion at the 
destination airports. (Sector congestion is not a factor, since sector capacities are 
generally adequate, see section on sector analysis.) For example, SYR has 24 flights to 
ORD and these flights account for 199 hours of the total 208 hours of departure delay.  
 
 
Airport 
Departure 
Delay 
(hrs) 
Take Off
Delay  
(hrs) 
Landing
Delay  
(hrs) 
Arrival 
Delay  
(hrs) 
Total 
Delay  
(hrs) 
Number of  
Commercial 
Operations 
 
Delay 
Per  
Op  
(secs) 
SYR 208.0 0.8 0.2 0.0 209.0 347 2168
ROC 161.1 0.6 0.3 0.0 162.0 291 2004
PWM 110.2 1.1 0.4 0.0 111.7 254 1583
Table 12 Commercial Flight Delays at Selected Small Airports (without VLJs) 
 
Figure 23 is a representation of the distribution of delays for the NGATS reduced times 
demand set (Case ID 7). Only flights with delay are included in this chart, flights with 
zero delay are excluded from the statistics. The intersection of the solid bars represents 
the Median (mid-point of the data, half the delays are larger and half smaller). The limits 
of the solid bars represent the 25th percentile and 75th percentile of the data and the end 
point lines represent the 10th percentile and 90th percentile of the data.  
 
This chart shows that for most airports 75% of flights have delays below 15 minutes, with 
the exception of ORD and MSN (Dane County Regional Airport, WI). However, the 90th 
percentile of delays is high for many smaller airports; these airports have several flights 
with very long delays.  
 
SYR has 15 flights with delays of more than 6 hours out of a total of 347 commercial 
operations and the maximum delay for a flight was 17 hours 29 minutes. ROC has 12 
flights with delays of more than 5 hours out of a total of 291 commercial operations and 
the maximum delay for a flight was 17 hours 18 minutes. PWM has 9 flights with delays 
of more than 5 hours out of a total of 254 commercial operations and the maximum delay 
for a flight was 16 hours 6 minutes. 
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ACES TFM is not being equitable in holding flights since these few small airports have 
much more delay per operation than other airports with flights into ORD. Holding flights 
for 16 or 17 hours is not realistic.  
 
ACES has the option of using a model of an Airlines Operations Center, which was not 
used for this analysis. This would have cancelled flights which are excessively delayed. 
However in the case analyzed here only a few flights are excessively delayed and a more 
sophisticated TFM model could have created an arrival slot by slightly increasing delay 
to one or more flights with much less delay to the same destination airport and allowed 
the few flights with large delay to take-off much earlier.  
 
The delay distribution chart only includes flights with delays, for some airports a 
significant number of flights do not have any delay. Figure 24 shows the percentage of 
flights with delays. ORD has the highest percentage of flights with delays of more than 
15 minutes. ORD has a total of 4720 commercial operations, 330 with zero delay, 2652 
with delays of 15 minutes or less and 1738 with delays of more than 15 minutes.  The 
percentage of flights at ORD with delays of more than 15 minutes has increased from 
15% for the 19 Feb 2004 to 36% for the 2025 case.  
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2025 Commercial Flights Total Delay for Top 50 Airports
(sorted by total delay)
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Figure 20 Commercial Flights Total Hours of Delay at Top 50 Airports for 2025 Demand Sets 
(without VLJs) 
2025 Commercial Flights Delay per Operation
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Figure 21 Commercial Flights Mean Delay per Operation at Top 50 Airports for 2025 Demand Sets 
(without VLJs) 
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Figure 22 SYR 2025 Scheduled Departures (without VLJs) 
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2025 Commercial Flights Delay Range for Top 50 Airports
(NGATS case with new routes and larger aircraft)
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Figure 23 Commercial Flights Delay Range at Top 50 Airports for 2025 Demand (without VLJs) 
 
2025 Percentage of Commercial Flights Delayed for Top 50 Airports
(NGATS case with new routes and larger aircraft)
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Figure 24 Percentage of Commercial Flights Delayed at Top 50 Airports for 2025 Demand (without 
VLJs) 
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2025 Delays with VLJ Air Taxis 
 
The analysis in this section is for the cases with NGATS reduced curb-to-curb times only 
since this is the scenario which meets the JPDO goals (Case ID 8 OEP case and Case ID 
9 non-OEP case), see Table 8. These are compared to the case without VLJs (Case ID 7). 
Delays at Airports with the Most VLJ Operations (VLJs at OEP Airports) 
 
Figure 25 below shows the total delay at the top 50 airports with the most VLJ 
operations. The figure shows the delay attributable to commercial flights only, not 
including GA and VLJs and the delay for all flights. Note that some airports do not have 
commercial airline operations, so have zero delay for the commercial only case. (See 
Figure 18 for the number of VLJ operations at each airport). 
 
Figure 26 shows the mean delays per operation for commercial only and all flights. All of 
the top 50 VLJ airports, including the OEP airports with VLJ operations have mean 
delays per operation below 7 minutes. Note that the mean delays per operation for all 
flights (commercial plus GA, VLJ and Cargo) is often lower than for commercial only – 
this is because GA and VLJ flights generally have lower delays than commercial flights 
since the majority fly to smaller less congested airports. 
 
 50 
 
 
2025 Total Delay at Top 50 Airports for VLJ Operations
(sorted by number of VLJ operations)
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Figure 25 Total Hours of Delay at Top 50 Airports with most VLJ Operations for 2025 Demand Set 
(VLJs at OEP Airports) 
2025 Delays per Operation at Top 50 Airports for VLJ Operations
(sorted by number of VLJ operations)
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Figure 26 Mean Delay per Operation at Top 50 Airports with most VLJ Operations for 2025 
Demand Set (VLJs at OEP Airports) 
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Delays at Airports with Largest Increase in Commercial Flights Total Delay (VLJs at 
OEP Airports) 
 
Figure 27 shows the airports with the largest increase in commercial flights total delay 
due to VLJ operations. Figure 28 shows the corresponding increase in mean delay per 
operation. (Case ID 9 compared to Case ID 7). 
 
EWR has the largest total increase in delay of 118 hours with a corresponding increase in 
mean delay per commercial flight operation of 219 seconds. EWR has 111 VLJ 
operations per day. The second largest increase in total delay is 60 hours at ORD with a 
corresponding increase in delay per operation of 45 seconds. This is an interesting result, 
since ORD does not have any VLJ operations. The reason for the increase in delay is due 
to network wide effects of VLJs at other airports that have flights to or from ORD. The 
effect on ORD is investigated in more detail later in this section. LAS shows an increase 
in total delay of 50 hours with an increase in delay per operation of 91 seconds. LAS is 
the 6th busiest airport for VLJ operations at 265 operations per day.  
 
Figure 29 shows the actual mean delays per commercial operation for the airports with 
the largest increase in total delay. A number of the airports have mean delays per 
operation of more than 15 minutes. In particular some of the smaller airports, SYR, ALB 
(Albany International Airport, NY), PWM have very large delays. However, all of these 
airports had large delays before the addition of VLJ operations; see Figure 21. SYR 
shows an increase in delay per operation due to VLJs of 78 seconds which is only 3.7%. 
The delays at these airports are unrealistically high, due to simplistic ACES TFM 
modeling as explained previously.  
 
Figure 30 is a representation of the distribution of delays.  
 
This chart shows that the Median delay at EWR has increased by 63% and the 90th 
percentile of delay has increased by 38% due to VLJs, compared with Figure 23. 
 
Figure 31 shows the percentage of flights with delays. 
 
The number of flights with delays of more than 15 minutes at EWR has increased by 39% 
from 357 flights to 497 flights, compared with Figure 24. 
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2025 Difference in Commercial Flights Total Delay for Top 50 Airports
 with VLJs not Excluded from OEP Airports
(sorted by difference in total delay)
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Figure 27 2025 Commercial Flights Difference in Total Delay at Top 50 Airports with Largest 
Increase in Delay (VLJs at OEP Airports) 
 
2025 Difference in Commercial Flights Delay per Operation for Top 50 Airports with VLJs 
not Excluded from OEP Airports
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Figure 28 2025 Commercial Flights Difference in Mean Delay per Operation at Top 50 Airports with 
Largest Increase in Delay (VLJs at OEP Airports) 
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2025 Commercial Flights Delay per Operation for Top 50 Airports with VLJs 
not Excluded from OEP Airports
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Figure 29 2025 Commercial Flights Mean Delay per Operation at Top 50 Airports with Largest 
Increase in Delay (VLJs at OEP Airports) 
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2025 Commercial Flights Delay Range for Top 50 Airports 
with VLJs not Excluded from OEP Airports
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Figure 30 2025 Commercial Flights Delay Range at Top 50 Airports with Largest Increase in Delay 
(VLJs at OEP Airports) 
2025 Percentage of Commercial Flights Delayed for Top 50 Airports
with VLJs not Excluded from OEP Airports
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Figure 31 2025 Percentage of Commercial Flights Delayed at Top 50 Airports with Largest Increase 
in Delay (VLJs at OEP Airports) 
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Delays at Airports with Largest Increase in Commercial Flights Total Delay (VLJs 
excluded from OEP Airports) 
 
Figure 32 shows the airports with the largest increase in commercial flights total delay 
due to VLJ operations with VLJs excluded from OEP airports. Figure 33 shows the 
corresponding increase in mean delay per operation (Case ID 8 compared to Case ID 7). 
 
ORD now has the largest total increase of 103 hours with a corresponding increase in 
mean delay per commercial flight operation of 78 seconds.  
 
The result for ORD for this test case is considered to be anomalous and is not used for 
computing the delays and costs to commercial air carriers. The reasons for this 
anomalous result from ACES are investigated later in this section. 
 
The second largest increase in total delay is 18 hours at DCA with a corresponding 
increase in delay per operation of 47 seconds. BWI shows an increase in total delay of 14 
hours with an increase in delay per operation of 43 seconds.   
 
Figure 34 shows the actual mean delays per operation for the airports with the largest 
increase in total delay.  As in the OEP case some small airports have large delays; all of 
these airports had large delays before the addition of VLJ operations. 
 
Figure 35 shows the airports which had the largest increase in total delay with VLJs at 
OEP airports compared to excluding VLJs from OEP airports. The previous results 
showed that EWR was the airport with the largest increase in total delay, but now that 
VLJ flights are excluded from EWR and other OEP airports, this airport is not 
significantly impacted by VLJ operations. The number of OEP airports with an increase 
in total delay of more than 10 hours has reduced from 17 to 3 (ORD, DCA, BWI) by 
excluding VLJs. Excluding VLJs is beneficial for most OEP airports as would be 
expected; the exception is ORD. There are not any VLJ operations at ORD even for the 
case where VLJs are not excluded from OEP airports. Despite this, ORD is impacted by 
VLJ operations and the impact actually increases from 60 hours to 103 hours total delay 
for the OEP excluded case. This is counter-intuitive; the reason for this increase is due to 
an artifact of ACES TFM as investigated later in this section. 
 
Figure 36 is a representation of the distribution of delays.  
 
This chart can be compared to Figure 30, the Median delay at ORD has increased from 
539 seconds to 590 seconds and the 90th percentile of delay has increased from 2338 
seconds to 2444 seconds compared to the case with VLJs excluded from OEP airports. 
 
Figure 37 shows the percentage of flights with delays. The number of flights with delays 
of more than 15 minutes at ORD has increased from 1745 flights to 1789 flights, 
compared with Figure 31. 
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2025 Difference in Commercial Flights Total Delay for Top 50 Airports
 with VLJs Excluded from OEP Airports
(sorted by difference in total delay)
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Figure 32 2025 Commercial Flights Difference in Total Delay at Top 50 Airports with Largest 
Increase in Delay (VLJs Excluded from OEP Airports) 
2025 Difference in Commercial Flights Delay per Operation for Top 50 Airports with VLJs 
Excluded from OEP Airports
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Figure 33 2025 Commercial Flights Difference in Mean Delay per Operation at Top 50 Airports with 
Largest Increase in Delay (VLJs Excluded from OEP Airports) 
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2025 Commercial Flights Delay per Operation for Top 50 Airports with VLJs 
Excluded from OEP Airports
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Figure 34 2025 Commercial Flights Mean Delay per Operation at Top 50 Airports with Largest 
Increase in Delay due to VLJs (VLJs Excluded from OEP Airports) 
 
2025 Comparison Between Difference in Commercial Flights Total Delay for Top 50 Airports 
with and without VLJs at OEP Airports
(sorted by difference in total delay for OEP case)
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Figure 35 2025 Commercial Flights Difference in Hours of Total Delay due to VLJs with and without 
VLJs at OEP Airports 
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2025 Commercial Flights Delay Range for Top 50 Airports
with VLJs Excluded from OEP Airports
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Figure 36 2025 Commercial Flights Delay Range at Top 50 Airports with Largest Increase in Delay 
(VLJs Excluded from OEP Airports) 
2025 Percentage of Commercial Flights Delayed for Top 50 Airports
with VLJs Excluded from OEP Airports
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Figure 37 2025 Percentage of Commercial Flights Delayed at Top 50 Airports with Largest Increase 
in Delay (VLJs Excluded from OEP Airports) 
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2025 Delays at Chicago O’Hare (ORD) 
 
The increase in commercial flights total daily delay at ORD due to VLJ operations is 60 
hours (5.1%) with VLJs at OEP airports (OEP case) and 103 hours (8.8%) with VLJs 
excluded from OEP airports (non-OEP case), see Table 13. The commercial flights mean 
delay per operation increases from 892 seconds without VLJs (Case ID 7) to 937 seconds 
for the OEP case (Case ID 9) and 970 seconds for the non-OEP case (Case ID 8). 
 
These are significant increases and are not caused by VLJ operations at ORD, since there 
are none for both cases, see Table 14. Figure 38 shows the scheduled departure 
operations at ORD for commercial and GA traffic. The maximum departure capacity and 
actual allocated departure capacity used by ACES are shown for comparison. The actual 
departure capacity is frequently less than the maximum. ACES selects departure and 
arrival priorities to best meet the demand, if there is significant arrival demand, the 
capacity allocated to departures can be less than the maximum. Demand is exceeding 
allocated capacity at many points throughout the day. 
 
The reason for increased delays at ORD is that destination airports may experience 
increased congestion due to VLJ operations, leading to increased ground hold delay at 
ORD. (Sector congestion could also cause increased delay, but since the sector capacities 
were increased by 3X for this analysis, this is not the cause of increased delay at ORD, 
see section on sector analysis later in this document.) 
 
Although the increase in delay at ORD due to VLJ operations is understandable, the 
increase in the delay of 43 hours between the OEP and non-OEP cases is not easy to 
explain, note that ORD has no VLJ operations for either case.  
 
The largest single source of delay for both cases is take-off delay, which is due to taxi 
and runway queues. Figure 39 shows the actual number of aircraft in the take off queue, 
but due to the randomness small differences are obscured. For this reason Figure 40 
shows the cumulative total of aircraft in the take off queue. It is now clear that the queue 
without any VLJ operations in the NAS is slightly smaller with a cumulative total of 
1246 aircraft, compared to the OEP VLJ case with 1326 aircraft. A slightly higher 
cumulative total of 1365 aircraft results when VLJs are excluded from OEP airports.  
 
For the non-OEP compared to the OEP case the take off delay has increased from 34 to 
59 hours accounting for 25 hours of the 43 hours total difference between cases. The 
departure delay, which is due to aircraft being held at the gate, has actually decreased by 
8 hours for the non-OEP case. This means aircraft are being released sooner which 
accounts for the increased taxi and runway queues. The reason for less ground hold delay 
is due to there being less congestion at the destination airports, due to VLJs being 
excluded from OEP airports. Figure 41 shows the take off delays for individual flights 
from ORD for both the OEP and non-OEP cases. Overall the departure delay is lower for 
the non-OEP case by 8 hours and of this difference, 5 hours is accounted for by flights to 
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EWR. For the OEP case, EWR has 111 VLJ operations, so removal of these operations 
allows ACES TFM to release flights to EWR earlier. 
 
The explanation for the increase in delay between the non-OEP and OEP cases seems to 
be therefore, that less congestion at destination airports leads to earlier release of aircraft 
at ORD; this causes an increase in take off delay, and because more departing aircraft are 
using the taxi-ways and runways also increases landing and arrival delay. It seems that 
ACES TFM is not optimally scheduling aircraft release from the gate at ORD since 
delaying the gate departure time slightly as for the OEP case would have resulted in less 
overall delay at ORD.  
 
However the differences are small compared to the total delay and overall ACES TFM 
has to take into account network wide effects. In fact the mean delay per commercial 
flight, network-wide decreases from 603 seconds to 562 seconds when VLJs are excluded 
from OEP airports indicating that ACES TFM appears to be working well at the network-
wide level1. 
 
1. There are several TFM components (agents) implemented within ACES and the interactions are 
complex, see the system design document, reference 6. 
 
 
Departure 
Delay (hrs) 
Take Off 
Delay (hrs)
Landing 
Delay (hrs)
Arrival 
Delay (hrs)
Total 
Delay (hrs) 
Delay 
Per  
Op (secs)
No VLJ 49 552 380 189 1,170 892
   
VLJ 
OEP 64 586 381 199 1,230 937
Increase 
over 
NO 
VLJ 15 34 1 10 60 45
VLJ 
NO 
OEP 56 611 395 211 1,273 970
Increase 
over 
NO 
VLJ 7 59 15 22 103 78
Table 13 Increase in Delays at ORD 
 
 
Number of 
Operations 
Commercial GA VLJ Total 
ORD 4720 39 0 4759
Table 14 Number of Commercial, GA and VLJ Operations at Airports within the Chicago TRACON 
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Figure 38 ORD 2025 Scheduled Departures 
 
ORD 2025 Take Off Queue Size
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Figure 39 ORD 2025 Take Off Queue Size 
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ORD 2025 Cumulative Take Off Queue
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Figure 40 ORD 2025 Cumulative Total of Aircraft in Take Off Queue 
 
Departure Delay for Top 50 Flights from ORD
(sorted by difference in departure delay)
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Figure 41 ORD 2025 Departure Delays 
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Analysis of Delays at Newark (EWR) 
 
EWR has the largest increase in both total delay and mean delay per operation of all 
airports due to VLJ operations when VLJ operations are not excluded from OEP airports.  
 
The increase in commercial flights total delay at EWR due to VLJ operations is 118 
hours (42%) with VLJs at OEP airports and increases by a negligible 2 hours with VLJs 
excluded from OEP airports, see Table 15. The mean delay per operation increases from 
524 seconds without VLJs (Case ID 7) to 985 seconds for the OEP case (Case ID 9) and 
is almost unchanged at 527 seconds for the non-OEP case (Case ID 8).  
 
The increase in delay for the OEP case is large and is mainly due to take off delay, 80 
hours additional, which is due to taxi and runway queues. EWR has 111 VLJ operations 
per day; see Table 16 which is a 5.7% increase in the total. The airport is already heavily 
loaded by the increase in commercial operations for 2025 and the increase in VLJ 
operations is causing significant additional delay. 
 
Figure 42 shows the scheduled departures at EWR for commercial and GA traffic and for 
the case with VLJs. There are 56 additional departures and although this is only a 5.7% 
increase of the total the result is a large increase in the queue for take off. Figure 43 
shows the number of aircraft in the take off queue reported by ACES for the case with 
and without VLJs. The maximum queue size increases from 25 aircraft to 36 aircraft for 
the VLJ case. This large increase occurs because EWR is near capacity. When an airport 
is near capacity a small increase in the number of operations will cause a 
disproportionately large increase in delay.  
 
The additional delay at EWR is eliminated if VLJs are excluded from OEP airports. This 
behavior is not the same as was observed at ORD. The cumulative total of aircraft in the 
take off queue differs by only 3 aircraft for the case without any VLJs and the case with 
VLJs, but excluded from OEP airports, see Figure 44. For ORD there was an additional 
cumulative total of 119 aircraft in the take off queue.  
 
The explanation for this is that most of the additional delay at EWR is caused by VLJ 
operations at EWR itself. ORD does not have any VLJ operations and the additional 
delay at ORD must therefore be caused by network wide interactions with other airports 
which do have VLJ operations.  
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Departure 
Delay (hrs) 
Take Off 
Delay (hrs)
Landing 
Delay (hrs)
Arrival 
Delay (hrs)
Total 
Delay (hrs) 
Delay 
Per  
Op (secs)
   
No VLJ 59 127 79 16 281 524
   
VLJ 
OEP 64 207 87 40 399 985
Increase 
over 
NO 
VLJ 5 80 8 24 118 461
VLJ 
NO 
OEP 55 129 82 17 283 527
Increase 
over 
NO 
VLJ -4 2 3 1 2 3
Table 15 Increase in Delays at EWR 
 
 
Number of 
Operations 
Commercial GA VLJ Total 
EWR 1932 13 111 2056
Table 16 Number of Commercial, GA and VLJ Operations at Airports within the New York 
TRACON 
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Figure 42 EWR 2025 Scheduled Departures 
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Figure 43 EWR 2025 Take Off Queue Size 
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Figure 44 EWR 2025 Cumulative Total of Aircraft in Take Off Queue 
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2025 Delays at Las Vegas (LAS) 
 
The increase in commercial flights total delay at LAS due to VLJ operations is 50 hours 
(81%) with VLJs at OEP airports; with VLJs excluded from OEP airports there is no 
increase in delay, see Table 17. The mean delay per operation increases from 113 seconds 
without VLJs (Case ID 7) to 204 seconds for the OEP case (Case ID 9) and does not 
increase for the non-OEP case (Case ID 7).  
 
The percentage increase in delay for the OEP case is large, although the actual delay per 
operation is still reasonable at 204 seconds. The largest component of the increase is 
take-off delay, 36 hours additional, which is due to taxi and runway queues. LAS has 265 
VLJ operations per day, see Table 17, which is a 12.5% increase in the total. The airport 
is already heavily loaded by the increase in commercial operations for 2025 and the 
increase in VLJ operations is causing significant additional delay. 
 
Figure 45 shows the scheduled departures at LAS for commercial and GA traffic and for 
the case with VLJs. There are 133 additional departures and the result is a large increase 
in the queue for take off. Figure 46 shows the number of aircraft in the take off queue 
reported by ACES for the case with and without VLJs. The maximum queue size 
increases from 13 aircraft to 19 aircraft for the VLJ case. Figure 47 shows that 
cumulative total of aircraft in the take off queue increases from 146 for the case without 
VLJs to 319 with VLJs at OEP airports.  
 
The departure schedule for LAS shows two large peaks in demand at epoch 49 and 92. It 
is likely that re-scheduling a number of flights into the preceding or following hours 
would reduce delay since there is some spare capacity at LAS in the hour before and after 
the main peaks.  
 
LAS actually does have sufficient capacity to handle the demand (assuming a 1.4X 
increase in capacity is feasible) even with the addition of VLJ air taxi operations, since 
delays remain reasonable. However the large percentage increase in delay that occurs 
indicates that LAS is nearing capacity, a more evenly distributed schedule will be 
necessary to avoid peaks in demand causing unacceptable delays. 
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Departure 
Delay (hrs) 
Take Off 
Delay (hrs)
Landing 
Delay (hrs)
Arrival 
Delay (hrs)
Total 
Delay (hrs) 
Delay 
Per  
Op (secs)
No VLJ 8 37 17 0 62 113
   
VLJ 
OEP 9 73 25 6 112 204
Increase 
over 
NO 
VLJ 1 36 8 6 50 91
VLJ 
NO 
OEP 9 36 17 0 62 113
Increase 
over 
NO 
VLJ 1 -1 0 0 0 0
Table 17 Increase in Delays at LAS 
 
 
Number of 
Operations 
Commercial GA VLJ Total 
LAS 1978 135 265 2378
Table 18 Number of Commercial, GA and VLJ Operations at LAS 
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Figure 45 LAS 2025 Scheduled Departures 
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Figure 46 LAS 2025 Take Off Queue Size 
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Figure 47 LAS 2025 Cumulative Total of Aircraft in Take Off Queue 
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ACES Enhanced TRACON Modeling 
 
ACES can model airports and TRACONS at different levels of fidelity, see the user guide 
reference 5. The main choices are: 
 
1. Simple airport nodal queuing model, single airport circular boundary, 4 
equally spaced departure and 4 arrival fixes, no fixes shared with other 
airports; 
2. Simple airport nodal queuing model, multiple airport actual TRACON 
boundary with actual departure and arrival fixes, fixes can be shared with 
other airports; 
3. As per (2) with the addition of runway spacing tables. 
 
ACES currently models most airports as per option (1) and this was the option used as the 
default for all airport models for the main results presented in this report to ensure 
consistency. The only TRACONS currently available in ACES with more detailed 
modeling are Chicago and New York. 
 
Chicago TRACON contains airports ORD, MDW (Chicago Midway Airport, Illinois) 
and PWK (Palwaukee Municipal Airport, Illinois). The Chicago TRACON is known as 
C90 and a useful description can be found at http://www.faa.gov/ats/c90/. The C90 
arrival and departure fixes as used in ACES are shown in Table 19 below. 
 
 
Table 19 ACES Definition of Arrival and Departure Fixes in Chicago TRACON C90 
 
New York TRACON contains airports EWR, FRG (Farmingdale, New York), TEB, JFK, 
and LGA. This model is of lower fidelity than Chicago since it only includes the actual 
arrival and departure fixes for EWR, not the other airports within the TRACON. 
 
This more detailed level of modeling may be expected to capture the effects of VLJs in 
the TRACON more effectively than the simple nodal model option (1).  For this reason a 
set of ACES runs was performed using the option (2) model and the results are presented 
below. Even with the enhanced TRACON models ACES still does not completely 
capture the effects of VLJs since it does not model trajectories within the TRACON 
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boundary. This means that spacing between flights and interaction between arrival and 
departure streams is not modeled and any potential conflicts, resolution actions and losses 
of separation can not be quantified. 
Analysis of Delays using the Chicago Enhanced TRACON Model Including 
Airports ORD, MDW, PWK 
 
The Chicago enhanced TRACON model shows higher delays than the simple model for 
all test cases. Total commercial flights delay at ORD is 16.1% higher without VLJs, 
15.5% higher with VLJs at OEP airports and 5.5% higher with VLJs excluded from OEP 
airports compared to using the simple TRACON model. Compare results in Table 13 and 
Table 20.  
 
Using the enhanced model, the increase in commercial flights total delay at ORD due to 
VLJ operations is 62 hours (4.6%) with VLJs at OEP airports (OEP case) and actually 
reduces slightly by 15 hours (-1.1%) with VLJs excluded from OEP airports (non-OEP 
case). The mean delay per operation increases from 1033 seconds without VLJs (Case ID 
7) to 1080 seconds for the OEP case (Case ID 9) and reduces slightly to 1021 seconds for 
the non-OEP case (Case ID 8). 
 
The increase in delays due to VLJs for the enhanced TRACON model compared to the 
simple model is similar for the OEP case (4.6% compared to 5.1%) but are completely 
different for the non-OEP case (-1.1% compared to 8.8%).   
 
For the simple TRACON model the increase in delays for the non-OEP case compared to 
the OEP case is understood to be an artifact of ACES TFM, see previous section. It is 
likely that the enhanced model result is more realistic.  
 
With the enhanced TRACON model, interactions between flights from airports within the 
C90 TRACON can occur. For the non-OEP case 260 VLJ flights from MDW have been 
excluded, see Table 21. Since MDW and ORD share several departure fixes, excluding 
VLJ flights from MDW would be expected to reduce delays for flights departing from 
ORD.  This does appear to be the case, departure delay has reduced by 20 hours from 85 
hours to 65 hours and take off delay has reduced by 50 hours from 571 to 521 hours, 
comparing the OEP to non-OEP cases in Table 20. Some of this reduction in delay can 
also be attributed to less congestion at destination airports, since test cases with the 
simple TRACON model showed 8 hours reduction in departure delay between the non-
OEP and OEP cases.  
 
Since the results for the non-OEP case are quite different for the simple and enhanced 
TRACON models, this indicates that it is necessary to carefully model the TRACON to 
fully capture the effects of VLJs at specific TRACONS. It may well be that a high 
fidelity model which includes trajectory propagation within the TRACON boundary is 
necessary to fully capture the effects of VLJs, and this is not currently available within 
ACES.  
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Redesign of the TRACON could also be a significant factor in reducing the effects of 
VLJs on commercial traffic. Currently MDW traffic is handled by the C90 TRACON 
controllers and shares departure fixes with ORD. In 2025, with the projected increased 
volume of traffic it might well be that MDW should not share any fixes with ORD and 
perhaps could even be part of a new TRACON. The effect of VLJs for specific 
TRACONS, including possible TRACON redesign requires a high fidelity model and 
should be the subject of a future study. 
 
 
Departure 
Delay (hrs) 
Take Off 
Delay (hrs)
Landing 
Delay (hrs)
Arrival 
Delay (hrs)
Total 
Delay (hrs) 
Delay 
Per  
Op (secs)
No VLJ 54 564 552 188 1358 1033
   
VLJ 
OEP 85 571 578 188 1421 1080
Increase 
over 
NO 
VLJ 30 7 25 0 62 47
VLJ 
NO 
OEP 65 521 584 174 1344 1021
Increase 
over 
NO 
VLJ 10 -44 32 -13 -15 -12
Table 20 Increase in Delays at ORD using Enhanced TRACON Model 
 
 
Number of 
Operations 
Commercial GA VLJ Total 
With OEP     
ORD 4720 39 0 4759
MDW 1022 274 260 1556
PWK 57 476 258 791
DPA 30 293 133 456
06C 0 33 140 173
Without OEP    
ORD 4720 39 0 4759
MDW 1022 274 0 1296
PWK 57 476 225 758
DPA 30 293 139 462
06C 0 33 86 119
Table 21 Number of Commercial, GA and VLJ Operations at Airports within the Chicago TRACON 
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 Airspace Sectors Analysis 
 
For this analysis the maximum number of flights in a sector sustained for a 5 minute 
interval is the metric analyzed as peak load, since this is in line with the FAA facility use 
of Monitor Alert Parameter (MAP) values. 
 
MAP values are not used directly by sector controllers; they are used by TFM to ensure 
that as far as possible a sector does not become significantly overloaded. Sector 
controllers will use their own judgment as to when to start refusing handoffs, request 
assistance or use other techniques to ensure that they can handle the traffic. They may 
handle more aircraft than the MAP value suggests for short periods.  
 
The ACES MAP values are not dynamic (they can be changed by scripting, but this 
feature was not used for this analysis) and may not be the actual values used on the 19 
Feb 2004 baseline day at any specific time of day.  
 
For the above reasons MAP values should not be taken as absolute, exceeding the MAP 
value by a few flights at peak times is not significant for this analysis. 
 
Note the following from FAA Order 7210.3U Facility Operation and Administration see 
http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/fac/Ch17/s1707.html 
 
“The Monitor Alert Parameter (MAP) establishes a numerical trigger value to provide 
notification to facility personnel, through the MA function of the ETMS, that 
sector/airport efficiency may be degraded during specific periods of time.” 
 
“The ability of a functional position or airport to provide air traffic services may be 
affected by a variety of factors (i.e., NAVACase IDs, meteorological conditions, 
communications capabilities, etc.); therefore MAP is a dynamic value which will be 
adjusted to reflect the capabilities of the functional position or airport.” 
 
“Baseline MAP values may be adjusted +/-3.” 
 
“TM initiatives should be primarily for those time frames when the MAP value will be 
equaled or exceeded for a sustained period of time (usually greater than 5 minutes).” 
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19 Feb 2004 Baseline Day Sector Load 
 
The peak number of flights in a sector for the 2004 baseline demand day is shown in 
Figure 48 compared to the MAP value. The peak load exceeds the MAP value by up to 4 
flights for several of the sectors and is at or slightly below the MAP value for the rest of 
the top 50 most heavily loaded sectors.   
 
This indicates that the most heavily loaded sectors are at full capacity in today’s NAS at 
peak times and would not be able to accommodate an increase in load. This is not 
unexpected since it would be wasteful of controller resources to design sectors with 
significant excess capacity. The most heavily loaded sectors are mainly high sectors 
(generally these are above 24,000 ft), low sectors are not congested. The most heavily 
loaded sector for this analysis of 19 Feb 2004 is ZAU76. This is a high altitude Chicago 
sector that transitions ORD westbound departures climbing to altitude and works a large 
volume of over-flight traffic. 
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Figure 48 19 Feb 2004 Peak Sector Load for Top 50 Sectors 
 
 76 
 
 
2025 Sector Load without VLJ Air Taxis 
 
The peak number of flights in a sector for the 2025 demand day without VLJ air taxis is 
shown in Figure 49 compared to the MAP value, which is 3X the ACES current day 
value. The busiest sectors are nearly all high sectors. In ACES, these sectors mainly have 
altitudes that start at 24,000 ft, although there are a number of high level sectors that start 
below that altitude, they are classed as high because the maximum altitude of the sector is 
above 24,000 ft. 
 
With two exceptions, the sector load does not exceed the MAP value, indicating that 3X 
sector capacities are generally adequate for the 2025 demand without VLJs. In fact for 
many of the top loaded sectors 2X sector capacity would be sufficient. 
 
The busiest sector is Chicago ZAU76, the same as 19 Feb 2004, but the second busiest is 
now ZAU75. Chicago sector ZAU75 is a high-altitude sector, for jet arrivals into O'Hare 
from the West and Southwest US. This sector has a 2025 peak load of 55 aircraft which is 
7 aircraft greater than the 3X MAP value. Chicago sector ZAU46 also has a peak load 
over the MAP value, but only by 4 aircraft. The locations of these sectors are shown in 
Figure 50. 
 
Since the 3X sector capacities used for the 2025 demand exceed the peak load for the 
majority of the sectors, with the exception of the few Chicago sectors, airspace 
congestion is not a significant cause of delays, for this analysis. 
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2025 Peak Sector Load for Top 50 Sectors 
(sorted by peak load) 
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Figure 49 2025 Peak Sector Load without VLJ Air Taxis for Top 50 Sectors 
 
 
Figure 50 Locations of Top 3 Busiest Chicago Sectors 
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2025 Sector Load with VLJ Air Taxis 
Sector Load with VLJs not excluded from OEP Airports 
 
The peak number of aircraft in a sector for the 2025 demand day with VLJs not excluded 
from OEP airports is shown in Figure 51 compared to the load without VLJs and to the 
MAP value. Figure 52 shows the difference in peak load. The top 3 sectors with the 
largest increase in load are low sectors; in the ACES default input data set these sectors 
generally have maximum altitudes below 24,000 ft. The low sectors are most impacted 
because nearly 60% of the VLJ flights in the demand set have cruise altitudes below 
24,000 ft due to the relatively short distances flown compared to commercial flights.  
 
There are a number of high sectors, and two super high sectors with significant increases 
in VLJs. Several of the high sectors with significant increases in peak load actually have 
low minimum altitudes; in fact 34 out of the top 50 sectors with increased load have 
altitudes starting below 24,000 ft. In ACES the super high sectors have maximum 
altitudes at or above 35,000 ft. The demand set contains nearly 11% of VLJ flights with 
cruise altitudes at or above 35,000 ft, so this explains why a few of the super high sectors 
show a slight increase in load with VLJ operations. 
 
The sector with the largest increase in peak load due to VLJs is Miami sector ZMA47 
which adds 12 aircraft, but the peak load of 27 aircraft is well within the 3X MAP value 
of 47 aircraft. The second largest increase is for Houston sector ZHU86, with 9 additional 
aircraft and the third largest is another Miami sector, ZMA66 with 6 additional aircraft 
peak load. For all of the sectors with the largest increases in peak load due to VLJ 
operations the MAP value is never exceeded. In fact there is plenty of spare capacity in 
the sectors most impacted, assuming that the NGATS goal of 3X sector capacity is 
achieved. 
 
The busiest sectors are not significantly impacted by VLJ operations, Chicago ZAU76 
(not shown on figure) is still the busiest sector; peak load only increases by 1 aircraft due 
to VLJs. Within the top 50 busiest sectors VLJs add the most peak load to Oakland 
ZOA33, 7 aircraft, but the load of 37 aircraft is well within the MAP value of 54 aircraft. 
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2025 Peak Sector Load for Top 50 Sectors with Largest Increase due to VLJ Operations
   (sorted by increase in peak load) 
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Figure 51 2025 Peak Sector Load with VLJ Air Taxis for Top 50 Sectors (VLJs at OEP airports) 
2025 Difference in Peak Sector Load with VLJs for Top 50 Sectors
 (sorted by increase in peak load) 
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Figure 52 2025 Peak Sector Load Difference with VLJ Air Taxis for Top 50 Sectors (VLJs at OEP 
airports)
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Sector Load with VLJs excluded from OEP Airports 
 
The peak number of aircraft in a sector for the 2025 demand day with VLJs is shown in 
Figure 53 compared to the load without VLJs and to the MAP value. Figure 54 shows the 
difference in peak load. The sectors differ somewhat from the case with VLJs using OEP  
airports. There are more high sectors impacted than the non-OEP case, 23 out of the top 
50 sectors with increased load have altitudes starting below 24,000 ft compared to 34 
previously. This is not due to any significant change in the altitudes flown by VLJ air 
taxis, the distances flown and cruise altitudes are virtually unchanged when VLJ air taxis 
are excluded from OEP airports. It is just a result of the different flight routes in the non-
OEP demand set. 
 
The top 3 sectors with the largest increase in load are still low sectors. Miami sector 
ZMA47 still shows the largest increase in peak load, now with an additional 15 aircraft at 
the peak load.  
 
Again, for all of the sectors with the largest increases in peak load due to VLJ operations 
the MAP value is never exceeded and the busiest sectors are little impacted by VLJ 
operations. Chicago ZAU76 (not shown on figure) is still the busiest sector; peak load 
shows no increase due to VLJs for the non-OEP case. Within the top 50 busiest sectors 
VLJs now add the most peak load to Salt Lake City sector ZLC33, 7 aircraft, but the load 
of 38 aircraft is well within the 3 X MAP value of 48 aircraft. 
 81 
 
 
2025 Peak Sector Load for Top 50 Sectors with Largest Increase due to VLJ Operations
   (sorted by increase in peak load) 
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
40
44
48
52
56
60
64
68
72
ZM
A
47
_L
O
W
ZB
W
46
L_
LO
W
ZL
C
33
_L
O
W
ZF
W
46
02
_H
IG
ZM
A
66
_L
O
W
ZL
A
27
_H
IG
H
ZO
A
13
_H
IG
H
ZL
A
16
_H
IG
H
ZL
A
38
_H
IG
H
ZF
W
48
01
_H
IG
ZB
W
24
_H
IG
H
ZT
L0
2_
S
U
P
ER
ZM
A
22
_L
O
W
ZH
U
83
_L
O
W
ZJ
X
15
_L
O
W
ZL
C
32
_L
O
W
ZH
U
86
_L
O
W
ZM
P
39
_H
IG
H
ZT
L2
4_
S
U
P
ER
ZF
W
89
01
_H
IG
ZM
P
17
_H
IG
H
ZO
B
18
_H
IG
H
ZT
L4
9_
LO
W
ZO
B
57
_H
IG
H
ZA
B
43
_L
O
W
ZL
A
39
_H
IG
H
ZO
A
31
_H
IG
H
ZA
U
39
_L
O
W
ZM
E
60
_L
O
W
ZO
B6
8_
SU
PE
ZN
Y
35
_L
O
W
ZH
U
84
_H
IG
H
ZO
A
23
_L
O
W
ZJ
X
10
_L
O
W
ZL
A
06
_L
O
W
ZL
A
17
E
_L
O
W
ZH
U
40
_L
O
W
ZI
D
85
_H
IG
H
ZI
D
88
_H
IG
H
ZM
E
26
_H
IG
H
ZJ
X
17
_H
IG
H
ZM
P
16
_H
IG
H
ZO
A
33
_H
IG
H
ZT
L3
4_
H
IG
H
ZJ
X
35
_H
IG
H
ZL
C
41
_H
IG
H
ZN
Y
42
_H
IG
H
ZO
B4
9_
SU
PE
ZD
V
14
_H
IG
H
ZN
Y
39
_L
O
W
Peak Load without VLJ Peak Load with VLJ MAP
 
Figure 53 2025 Peak Sector Load with VLJ Air Taxis for Top 50 Sectors (VLJs excluded from OEP 
airports) 
 
2025 Difference in Peak Sector Load with VLJs for Top 50 Sectors
 (sorted by increase in peak load) 
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Figure 54 2025 Peak Sector Load Difference with VLJ Air Taxis for Top 50 Sectors (VLJs excluded 
from OEP airports) 
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En-route Conflicts Analysis 
 
ACES does not model trajectories within a TRACON boundary, instead a queuing model 
is used to estimate delays. For this reason only en-route conflicts are reported. This is a 
limitation since VLJs operating within the same TRACON as a major OEP airport, even 
if excluded from the OEP airport may cause a significant increase in conflicts with 
commercial traffic.  
 
The en-route conflict detection algorithm in ACES reports a conflict when aircraft are 
separated by less than 2000 ft in altitude and less than 7 nm in distance (default can be 
changed). The current FAA separation minimum is 5 nm so ACES is actually reporting 
potential conflicts; a 2 nm buffer is used to allow for conflict resolution. In addition 
ACES only allows specification of a single parameter for altitude separation so does not 
take into account reduced Vertical Separation Minimum which requires 1000 ft minimum 
between FL290–410. NGATS also expects future technology to enable en-route 
minimum lateral separations to be reduced; this was not evaluated in this study. For these 
reasons the actual conflict counts reported by ACES are only potential conflicts and also 
overstate the number of potential conflicts that require resolutions in the 2025 demand 
scenario. 
 
Table 22 below shows the number of times an aircraft of each category was involved in a 
conflict for each of the demand sets analyzed. The most potential conflicts occurred for 
commercial aircraft, this is as expected since the largest single category of aircraft in the 
demand sets is commercial flights see Table 7. The addition of VLJs increases the 
number of potential conflicts by 6.6% for the non-OEP case and by 6.9% for the OEP-
case, see Table 23. VLJs are directly involved in 2939 of the additional 5146 potential 
conflicts for the non-OEP case and 3286 of the additional 5349 potential conflicts for the 
OEP case. The reason that the increase in the total number of potential conflicts is greater 
than the number of potential conflicts where at least one of the aircraft is a VLJ is due to 
interactions between VLJs and other traffic. Secondary potential conflicts between non-
VLJ traffic may be caused by solving a conflict involving a VLJ.   
 
The largest increase in potential conflicts was for GA traffic, 5.6% and 5.8% for the non-
OEP and OEP cases. The increase in commercial aircraft potential conflicts was much 
less at 2.1 and 1.9 % for the two cases analyzed. This indicates that VLJs interact more 
with other VLJs and other GA traffic than with commercial traffic, as expected since the 
majority of VLJ flights are at lower altitudes than most commercial traffic. Commercial 
traffic has a mean altitude of 26,200 ft for all commercial flights in the 2025 demand set, 
GA has a mean altitude of 24,000 ft and VLJ traffic has a mean altitude 24,200 ft, see 
section on distance distribution of air traffic. VLJs are flying at much the same altitudes 
as GA traffic, somewhat below the altitudes of the majority of commercial flights.  
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The VLJ variable cost business model results in slightly longer flight distances with a 
corresponding increase in mean altitude to 25,900 ft. This results in about the same total 
number of potential conflicts. There is a slight increase in the number of commercial 
aircraft potential conflicts and a corresponding decrease in GA potential conflicts due to 
the increased VLJ altitudes.  
 
 
 
 
Run 
Case ID 
 Commercial GA Cargo VLJ Total 
1 19 Feb 2004 16336 2747 768 0 19851 
4 2025 N/L 
NG 
58060 15945 3494 0 77499 
6 2025 N/L 
NG VLJ 
59282 16841 3583 2939 82645 
8 2025 N/L 
NG OVLJ 
59136 16868 3576 3268 82848 
10 2025 N/L 
NG OVLJ 
VC 
59428 16807 3583 3000 82818 
Table 22 Total Potential Conflicts by Operator Type 
 
 
 
 Commercial GA Cargo VLJ Total 
+VLJ 
excluded 
from OEP 
Airports 2.1 5.6 2.5 n/a 6.6
+VLJ at 
OEP 
Airports 1.9 5.8 2.3 n/a 6.9
+VLJ 
Variable 
Cost at 
OEP 
Airports 2.4 5.4 2.5 n/a 6.9
Table 23 Percentage Increase in Potential Conflicts due to VLJs 
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Cost to Commercial Air Carriers 
 
The commercial air carriers operating costs calculated in this analysis are based on the 
fleet and operations weighted air carrier costs contained in reference 7. From this FAA 
sponsored source, the average air carrier variable operating cost for aircraft adjusted to 
2005 $ is $2284 per hour in the air, $1760 on the ground with engines operating while 
taxiing or waiting for takeoff and  $880 while waiting in ground hold with engines off 
and only auxiliary power units operating. The reduced costs on the ground reflect 66% 
and 95% reduction in fuel/ oil costs respectively, compared to in the air consumption. 
The cost data used in this analysis are summarized in Table 24.  
 
Cost per hr Airborne  Ground  Ground Hold 
Aircraft Average $2,284  $1,760  $880  
Table 24 Commercial Air Carriers Variable Operating Costs 
 
These values are used to calculate the estimated cost to commercial air carriers due to 
additional delays caused by VLJ air taxi operations, according to the flight segment 
where the delay occurred. Only the variable operating costs are included, not fixed costs 
since only variable costs can be directly related to delays. 
 
The estimated annual cost to commercial air carriers of delays in the NAS in 2025 is 
$4.04 billion without VLJ air taxi operations and this increases to $4.47 billion if VLJ Air 
taxi operations are not excluded from OEP airports. VLJ air taxi service operators may 
choose not to use OEP airports due to cost or because of congestion. In this case the 
annual cost of delays to commercial air carriers is estimated to be $4.08 billion. 
 
The direct annual increase in operating costs to commercial air carriers attributable to the 
additional delays caused by VLJ air taxi operations is $425.6 million if VLJs are not 
excluded from OEP airports; this is a 10.5% increase. Excluding VLJs from OEP 
Airports reduces the annual increase in costs to $42.6 million; this is a 1.1% increases. 
Results are summarized in Table 25 which includes the costs by flight segment. 
 
The costs for the non-OEP case exclude the result for ORD which is considered to be 
anomalous, see the Airports Analysis section of this report. 
 
Although the total increase in cost is quite large for the OEP case, to put this into 
perspective, the 2025 projected daily flights in the NAS for commercial air carrier 
operations is 64,000 per day, see Table 7, so the mean increase in cost per flight is $18 
for the OEP case and is $1.82 for the non-OEP case. 
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  Hours of 
Delay in 
Demand 
Day 
Annual 
Hours of 
Delay 
Cost of Delay Increase due 
to VLJs 
Percentage 
Increase 
2004 NO 
VLJs 
totalDelay 
4,559 1,664,063 $2,075,458,316
 
 airDelay 431 157,139 $358,904,756  
 grndDelay 1,216 443,705 $780,920,177  
 holdDelay 2,913 1,063,220 $935,633,384  
   
2025 NO 
VLJs 
totalDelay 9,106 3,323,657 $4,042,054,262  
 airDelay 914 333,536 $761,795,961  
 grndDelay 2,020 737,445 $1,297,902,819  
 holdDelay 6,172 2,252,677 $1,982,355,483  
   
totalDelay 9,222 3,365,884 $4,084,623,164 $42,568,902 1.1%
airDelay 926 337,890 $771,741,293  
grndDelay 2,018 736,645 $1,296,494,535  
2025 
VLJs 
Excluded 
From 
OEP 
holdDelay 
6,278 2,291,349 $2,016,387,336
 
   
totalDelay 9,999 3,649,753 $4,467,614,343 $425,560,081 10.5%
airDelay 998 364,285 $832,026,490  
grndDelay 2,317 845,882 $1,488,752,364  
2025 
VLJs 
Not 
Excluded 
From 
OEP 
holdDelay 6,684 2,439,586 $2,146,835,489  
Table 25 Annual Costs of Delays to Commercial Air Carriers 
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Concluding Remarks and Recommendations for Future 
Studies 
Conclusions 
 
This study has shown that VLJ air taxi operations can potentially impact commercial air 
traffic leading to some increase in delay and consequently some increase in costs to 
commercial air carriers. Adding 20,000 additional VLJ flights per day in 2025 to a 
system projected to have close to 100,000 Commercial Airline, Scheduled Commuter, air 
taxi, General Aviation and Cargo flights per day in total is a significant additional load. 
 
However, it is likely that VLJ air taxi service operators will choose not to use the top 35 
(OEP) large airports due to cost or because of congestion and use smaller less congested 
airports. If this is the case, then the effects of VLJs could be fairly small.  
 
The additional delays to commercial air traffic due to VLJs are mainly due to airport 
capacity limitations, but potentially can be mitigated. TRACON re-design could 
potentially reduce interactions between traffic using smaller airports within or close to a 
large airport, although this was not investigated for this study. 
 
The addition of VLJ flights was found to not overload en-route sectors, although an 
increase in potential conflicts with commercial air traffic was observed. This result 
depends on the assumed 3X increase in sector capacity being achievable. If the sector 
capacities were only about 2X current values, then the additional VLJ traffic could 
significantly increase en-route delay. VLJs are projected to generally fly at lower 
altitudes than most commercial traffic, due to shorter average trips distances. The 
majority of lower level en-routes sectors are not heavily loaded, but some are, and a 
proportion of VLJs do fly at higher altitudes through the more heavily loaded sectors.  
 
This study has been limited by the fidelity of ACES modeling, particularly within the 
terminal area, and this is where the effects of VLJs are expected to be most significant. 
For this reason the results should be treated with caution particularly for individual 
airports, although the overall system wide effects determined from the analysis shows an 
increase in system wide delays to commercial air traffic due to VLJs as expected. 
 
On-demand air-taxi flights using VLJs are projected to become an increasingly important 
mode of the air transportation system and warrant further study.  
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Recommended TRACON Study 
 
It is recommended that the effects of VLJs in the terminal area be investigated in detail 
using a higher fidelity model, ideally with trajectory propagation within the TRACON 
boundary. This model could be developed and incorporated into ACES or the use of 
alternative simulators could be considered. Specific TRACONS could be selected for 
study, for example Chicago C90 which has several airports attractive to VLJs in 
proximity to ORD; these include MDW, PWK, DPA and 06C. The New York TRACON 
is also of interest with 3 major airports, EWR, LGA, JFK in proximity to TEB and FRG 
which are attractive airports for VLJ operations. 
 
This study should examine the effects on VLJs in the current TRACON design and 
should investigate theoretical re-designs and the use of NGATS technologies to indicate 
ways in which the effects of VLJs can be mitigated. Of particular interest would be the 
increase in potential conflicts within the TRACON that might occur due to increased 
traffic in general and increased complexity of traffic flows. The increased use of smaller 
airports in proximity to major airports, by VLJs may cause a more complex interaction 
between departure and arrival flows, from these airports and the major airport, where 
currently there is little traffic from the small airports.  
 
Recommended En-route Airborne Separation Assurance System 
Study 
 
It is recommended that the effects of VLJs in en-route airspace be investigated in detail. 
The assumption of 3X sector capacity should be examined and the need for sectorization 
of en-route airspace in a future NAS should be questioned.  
 
The use of self separation by VLJs using a system such as NASA Langley’s proposed 
4D-Airborne Separation Assurance System (4D-ASAS) should be investigated. Although 
the assumed 3X sector capacity limits are generally not exceeded, the number of potential 
conflicts increases with VLJ air taxi operations. Most of the increase is due to 
interactions between VLJs and with GA traffic, since VLJs tend to fly at lower altitudes 
than commercial air carrier flights.  
 
The effect of VLJs on other air traffic could be considerably reduced if VLJ air taxis were 
equipped to self separate. It may be feasible to allow self separation within a specific 
altitude band, perhaps 18,000 ft to 26,000 ft, for equipped aircraft. Other aircraft would 
not be excluded, but would be under positive control from controllers or ground 
automation. Equipped VLJs would be responsible for avoiding other traffic. 
 
VLJs may be ideal candidates for adopting such a system. VLJs will be equipped with 
modern navigation and flight management systems and it may be feasible to incorporate a 
version of ASAS at reasonable cost - the study should include an estimate of the 
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approximate cost. The on-demand nature of air-taxi operations does not lend itself to 
longer-term planning as for scheduled flights and it may be advantageous to have the 
capability to operate autonomously, with a high degree of independence from ground 
based ATC and automation systems.  
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